KEEPING SCORE: IMPROVING THE POSITIVE
FOUNDATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY
William E. Kovacic*
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 50
I. THE AMBIGUOUS, DISPUTED SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA ON
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ..................................................... 60
II. HOW THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE ANALYSIS AFFECTS OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATION OF THE U.S. ANTITRUST
REGIME .................................................................................... 67
A. Excessive and Misdirected Enforcement Activity: Two
Narratives from the Late 1970s ........................................ 70
B. The Inadequate and Misdirected Enforcement Activity
Narrative........................................................................... 86
C. How Narratives Predicated Upon Mistaken Positive
Assumptions Distort Understanding About the Functioning
of the U.S. Antitrust Regime ............................................ 95
III. HOW THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE ANALYSIS AFFECTS ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY PERFORMANCE .............................. 101
A. Building Historical Awareness: The FTC in the 1970s.... 102
IV. HISTORICAL DATA-BASED ANALYSIS FOR ANTITRUST AGENCIES:
FOCAL POINTS........................................................................ 108
A. Determining What Happened ........................................... 109
B. Using Positive Data to Make Normative Assessments..... 110
C. Improving Agency Historical Awareness ......................... 112
D. Historical Analysis: Gains from Fuller Application ......... 119
E. Case Reconstructions ........................................................ 121
F. Institutional Methods......................................................... 129
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 130
*

Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law
School; Visiting Professor, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London; NonExecutive Director, United Kingdom Competition & Markets Authority. The author
received many useful comments and suggestions from Rory Van Loo and other participants
in the summer 2020 antitrust research workshop convened by Professor Daniel Sokol of the
University of Florida’s Levin School of Law. The author is most grateful for the excellent
editorial guidance of the members of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business
Law. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Contact: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu.

49

50

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

INTRODUCTION
At the start of class in a new academic term, students often ask their
instructors, “What is the basis for the grade in this course?” In 2001, after
fifteen years of fielding that question in university classrooms, I became a
senior official at the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). On many
occasions, a variant of my students’ perennial query came to mind: What is
the basis for the grade in this course? How should my agency’s performance
be evaluated?1
The question that occupied my thoughts at the FTC attracts vigorous
debate today as a growing body of commentators and elected officials calls
for dramatic changes in the U.S. competition policy regime. 2 Reform
advocates have proposed a fundamental reorientation of federal antitrust
enforcement, a major redesign of the competition statutes, and the creation
of new tools to regulate dominant firms, especially large information
services platforms.3 Not since the early-to mid-1970s has the mood reflected
in public debate and legislative deliberations so welcomed a thorough
overhaul of the U.S. competition law system.4
1. See William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903 (2009) [hereinafter Rating the Competition
Agencies] (offering reflections on criteria for assessing performance of public antitrust
authorities).
2. See Daniel A. Crane, The New Crisis in Antitrust (?), 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2020)
(discussing modern debate about U.S. antitrust policy); A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Law
and Its Critics, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 269 (2020) (same).
3. These proposals are summarized in Alison Jones & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust’s
Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy, 65
ANTITRUST BULL. 227 (Issue 2, 2020) [hereinafter Implementation Blind Side].
4. In the early-to mid-1970s, Congress pressed the federal antitrust agencies to initiate
cases to deconcentrate large segments of the U.S. economy. See William E. Kovacic,
Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool
for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1126–27 (1989) [hereinafter Failed
Expectations] (describing congressional encouragement in 1970s for federal antitrust
agencies to undertake cases to restructure concentrated industries). The exhortations of
legislators drew upon scholarly work and the findings of expert panels that recommended
expansive efforts to break up dominant firms and tight oligopolies. Id. at 1136–37. The
federal agencies responded to this guidance by bringing an ambitious collection of cases
challenging single-firm misconduct and collective dominance. Id. at 1119–20. In this same
period, Congress enacted major reforms to the U.S. antitrust laws. In 1974, it raised the
status of the criminal antitrust offense from a misdemeanor to a felony and boosted fines
and prison terms for infringements. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, P.L. 93-528, 88
Stat. 1706 (1974). In 1976, Congress renovated the merger control mechanism by requiring
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The contemporary reform proposals seem to be having a genuine effect.
The calls for expanded enforcement already seem to have moved the federal
antitrust authorities, the FTC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), to
adopt a more aggressive posture.5 On October 20, 2020, the DOJ and eleven
state attorneys general filed a complaint charging Google with illegal
monopolization in various markets related to search. 6 There are also
indications that Congress will give serious attention to bills to amend the
antitrust laws and alter the competition policy institutional framework.7
A predicate for the reform demands is the view that the DOJ and the
FTC have failed miserably in performing their law enforcement duties in the
advance notification to the antitrust agencies of certain proposed mergers and imposing a
suspensory period in which the agencies could gather information to review such deals.
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
5. Since 2019, the DOJ and the FTC have been investigating possible antitrust
violations involving the country’s leading information technology firms. See Jones &
Kovacic, Implementation Blind Side, supra note 3, at 237–38.
6. U.S. v. Google LLC, Case 1:20-cv-03010 (Oct. 20, 2020) [hereinafter DOJ Google
Complaint], available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1329131/download
[https://perma.cc/7SM5-EDYG]. A number of other state attorneys general appear to be
preparing to file a monopolization complaint against Google that alleges a broader range of
anticompetitive conduct. Diane Bartz, Google’s antitrust legal woes far from over if Biden
wins, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-election-google-bidenidUSL1N2HA1ZP [https://perma.cc/GLX5-PPU7] (reporting comments by Colorado
Attorney General Phil Weiser, who indicated that various state attorneys general will
conclude their investigation of Google “in the coming weeks”). The FTC is reported to
have met recently to discuss the status of its inquiry into Facebook and the possibility of
bringing a case against the social media giant. Tony Room, FTC said to huddle privately to
discuss Facebook antitrust probe, signaling advanced stage, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/22/facebook-ftc-antitrust/ [https://per
ma.cc/BXD6-FGR7].
7. On July 29, 2020, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial,
and Administrative Law held hearings to take testimony from the chief executive officers of
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. During the proceedings, the panel’s Chair (Rep.
David Cicilline) and several of his colleagues called for new legislation to strengthen the
existing antitrust laws to control dominant technology platforms. Online Platforms and
Market Power, Part 6: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., and Admin. L. of Just. Of the H. comm. On the
Judiciary, 116th Cong (2020)(statement of Rep. David Cicilline). On October 6, 2020, the
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law released
a majority staff report calling for sweeping changes to the U.S. antitrust system, including
the creation of new regulatory mechanisms to oversee leading digital platforms.
Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and
Recommendations, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law,
House Committee on the Judiciary 376-405 (2020) [hereinafter Majority Staff Report],
available at https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7JL-KKZV] (presenting antitrust and regulatory reform
recommendations).
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modern era, a period that, in critical commentary, begins in 2000 and
sometimes extends back to roughly 1980.8 The critiques are razor sharp. The
federal agencies are said to be cowardly or slothful in executing their
mandates,9 captured by commercial interests,10 and corrupted by a revolving
door culture that imbues agency leaders and staff with tolerant attitudes
toward big business.11 A frequent claim is that the DOJ and the FTC have
brought too few lawsuits to attack improper conduct by dominant firms, and
their meagre caseload is top-heavy with assaults upon individual
entrepreneurs who collaborate to gain just wages.12 While the agencies cast
their nets for commercial minnows, immense corporate sharks swim freely
and devour everything in their path. This policy default is said to endanger
not only the nation’s economy and vital social institutions, but also to

8. Jonathan Tepper writes: “Antitrust authorities once fought against monopolies, but
for the last four decades they have given a green light to merger after merger. The
guardians who were meant to protect competition have become the principal cheerleaders
for monopolies.” Jonathan Tepper, Why Regulators Went Soft on Monopolies, THE
AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE 26, 31 (Jan. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Regulators]. For similar
critiques, see Barry C. Lynn, Liberty from All Masters: The New American Autocracy vs.
the Will of the People 191–217 (2020) (describing intellectual and political forces that
spurred relaxation of U.S. antitrust policy from 1980 to present); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK
‘EM UP – RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY 211-12
(2020) [hereinafter BREAK ‘EM UP] (attacking federal antitrust enforcement policy from
early 1980s to the present); MATT STOLLER, GOLIATH – THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN
MONOPOLY POWER AND DEMOCRACY 407–39 (2019) [hereinafter GOLIATH] (criticizing
federal antitrust policy from late 1970s to present); TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS –
ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 108 (2018) [hereinafter CURSE OF BIGNESS] (stating that
during the presidency of George W. Bush, “the anti-monopoly provisions of the Sherman
Act went into a deep freeze from which they have never really recovered”).
9. JONATHAN TEPPER & DENISE HEARN, THE MYTH OF CAPITALISM – MONOPOLIES AND
THE DEATH OF COMPETITION 116 (2019) [hereinafter MYTH OF CAPITALISM] (“Dozens of
industries are so egregiously concentrated that it begs the question as to what the authorities
are doing with their time. We don’t know. We know for a fact that workers at the
Securities and Exchange Commission spent their time watching porn while the economy
crashed during the financial crisis. We would hate to speculate about the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.”).
10. THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL – HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE
MARKETS 259–78 (2019).
11. DAVID DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED – LIFE IN THE AGE OF CORPORATE POWER 282-85
(2020) [hereinafter MONOPOLIZED].
12. Sandeep Vaheesan, How Robert Bork Fathered the New Gilded Age, PROMARKET
BLOG (Sept. 5, 2019), https://promarket.org/2019/09/05/how-robert-bork-fathered-the-newgilded-age/ [https://perma.cc/D9Q9-TRF2] [hereinafter New Gilded Age] (“[T]he
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission today mostly leave Google,
Walmart, and other powerful businesses across the economy alone and seek to suppress the
collective action of workers in the service economy.”).

2020]

KEEPING SCORE

53

threaten democracy itself.13
The evaluation of agency performance sketched above has what
academics would call a positive dimension and a normative dimension. The
positive element focuses on what happened: What law enforcement
programs did the DOJ and the FTC undertake with the resources and powers
entrusted to them, and why did they act as they did? In examining the
agencies’ law enforcement activities, a positive inquiry seeks to determine
which cases the agency initiated, determine how the cases were resolved, and
identify the rationales that guided the selection and disposition of cases.
The normative dimension of evaluation takes the positive record and
judges the quality of the agency’s program. In simple terms, it asks whether
the agency did a good job with what it had. A normative assessment has two
ingredients. One element focuses on the quality of what the agency did: Did
the agency initiate matters – bring cases, promulgate rules, issue reports –
that made society better off? Did it bring enough cases? Did it stand down
when it should have intervened? Did it bring the right cases – confronting,
rather than ducking, difficult problems of urgent public concern? Taken as
a whole, did the full portfolio of agency projects deliver the best possible
return on society’s investment?
The second element of the normative assessment evaluates how the
agency carried out its responsibilities: Did it apply its authority fairly? Did
it form organizational structures to set priorities and select projects wisely
and devise operational methods to deliver projects effectively? Has the
agency improved by learning over time – for example, by subjecting its
decisions to probing assessment after the fact, carrying forward what it did
well, and correcting deficiencies?
In older and more recent debates about the adequacy of federal antitrust
enforcement, perceptions about the positive record supply the foundation for
normative assessments of the quality of the U.S. competition law system.14
13. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Reigniting Competition in the American Economy,
Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets Program Event (Washington, D.C., June
29, 2016), available at https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2016-6-29_Warren_
Antitrust_Speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL27-U5TP] (“[T]oday in America, competition is
dying. Consolidation and concentration are on the rise in sector after sector. Concentration
threatens our markets, threatens our economy, and threatens our democracy.”). See also
THOM HARTMANN, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF MONOPOLIES – HOW BIG BUSINESS DESTROYED
AN AMERICAN DREAM 91–147 (2020) [hereinafter HIDDEN HISTORY] (describing how
increasing concentration of economic power has undermined the U.S. economy and the
country’s democratic institutions); BINYAMIN APPLEBAUM, THE ECONOMISTS’ HOUR – HOW
THE FALSE PROPHETS OF FREE MARKETS FRACTURED OUR SOCIETY 158 (2019) [hereinafter
ECONOMISTS’ HOUR] (“Corporate concentration also is taking a toll on democracy.”).
14. For example, in February 2008, during the primaries to select the Democratic
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Understandings of what happened in the past shape views about what should
happen in the future. Today the perceived inadequacies in the amounts and
types of DOJ and FTC law enforcement activity figure prominently in
contemporary indictments of these agencies and supply important evidence
for the case for reform.15 The reform-oriented normative assessments derive
considerable analytical and rhetorical power from recitals about the positive
record of the what the agencies did and what they did not do.
This article makes the case for commentators and policymakers to
devote more attention to the positive dimension of competition agency
performance. It makes two arguments for building better positive
foundations regarding past agency activity. The first is that developing an
accurate positive account of what antitrust agencies have done in the past is
vital to forming sound normative judgments about the future design and
operation of a competition policy system. The Article shares the premise,
expressed fifty years ago by Richard Posner, that “the collection and analysis
of statistical data of legal institutions is a fruitful and practicable undertaking
for students of those institutions.”16 If the positive assumptions in policy
analysis are infirm, the normative assessments may topple. In a striking
number of instances in debates about U.S. antitrust policy, in earlier times
and today, the positive account of what the FTC and DOJ have done (and
why they have acted as they did) is unreliable as a basis for policy making.17
The second reason to focus on the positive dimension of policy analysis
is that better understanding of past activity and, more generally, closer
attention to institutional issues of design, organization, and operations can
be valuable sources of continuous policy improvement for a competition
agency.18 By reason of their longevity (130 years for the DOJ and 105 years
Party’s candidate to run for the presidency, Barack Obama said “the current administration
has what may be the weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the
last half-century.” Campaign Statement from Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the
American Antitrust Institute (Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter AAI Statement]. Senator Obama’s
normative assessment (“may be the weakest record”) presumably rested upon a comparison
of positive data regarding enforcement from the end of the Eisenhower administration (the
“half-century” period mentioned in the statement would have begun in 1958) through the
end of the George W. Bush administration.
15. Tepper, Regulators, supra note 8, at 27 (“Antitrust law is not so much dormant as it
is actively sabotaged by the very people who should enforce it. The DOJ and the FTC’s
policies today are best described as aggressive do-nothingism.”).
16. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & ECON.
365, 365 (1970).
17. See infra notes 170-209 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in the depiction
of record of federal enforcement in commentary and debates about U.S. antitrust policy).
18. Modern scholarship on antitrust and other areas of economic regulatory policy
reflects a growing awareness of the links between institutional arrangements and the
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for the FTC), 19 the federal antitrust agencies have accumulated vast
experience in conducting investigations, prosecuting cases, implementing
remedies, and applying other policy instruments. This body of experience
has yielded what might be called “antitrust big data.”20 If studied and mined
effectively, antitrust big data can supply valuable insights into the
appropriate path for future policy development. Learning from experience
has enabled the DOJ and the FTC to make significant improvements over
time.21 This Article argues that the U.S. agencies can derive still greater
benefits from learning by assembling and studying better data sets on past
activity and by developing a deeper understanding of the history of antitrust
enforcement generally. This consideration would be a good reason to
improve the positive foundations for policy making even if the United States
were not in the midst of a grand debate about the future of its antitrust system.
A better understanding of the positive record of antitrust enforcement
has at least three implications relevant to modern policy making. First, for
advocates of basic change in U.S. antitrust enforcement, better historical
awareness of what the DOJ and the FTC have done can illuminate lessons
useful in prosecuting new cases, especially initiatives that challenge the
performance of public agencies. See THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS –
GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds.,
2012)(analyzing antitrust enforcement across the globe and concluding that there are
common norms despite disparate institutional arrangements); Oliver Budzinski & Annika
Stöhr, Competition Policy Reform in France and Germany – Institutional Change in the
Light of Digitization, 15 EUROPEAN COMPETITION J. 15 (2019) (discussing whether or not
European competition policy should emulate German reforms and thereby improve its
institutional framework); DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT (2011) (examining origins and performance of US antitrust enforcement
institutions); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters:
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446 (2014)
(examining the costs and benefits of the design choices made by the architects of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); Alison Jones & William E. Kovacic, The
Institutions of U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Comments for the U.S. House Judiciary
Committee on Possible Competition Policy Reforms (Apr. 17, 2020) (commenting on the
investigation by the House Judiciary Committee into the state of competition in the digital
marketplace).
19. The country’s first national antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was adopted in 1890.
Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914, and the FTC began
operations in March 1915.
20. This concept is introduced in William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall & Michael J.
Meurer, Serial collusion by multi-product firms, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 296 (2018)
[hereinafter Serial Collusion].
21. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest? What
Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 313–15 (2016) [hereinafter
Consume or Invest] (discussing development of FTC competition programs involving health
care and pharmaceutical sectors).
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market positions and practices of dominant enterprises. Second, better
historical awareness can increase the capacity of the federal agencies to
improve programs, such as enforcement against cartels, that tend to
command approval from antitrust traditionalists and reform advocates, alike.
Third, a better understanding of what the federal antitrust agencies have
done, and what considerations motivated the design of their law enforcement
programs, can inform enhancements of regulatory policy making and public
administration. In all of these respects, the seemingly straightforward
exercise of collecting and disclosing accurate data on agency activity can
support efforts to tackle longstanding public policy challenges of
implementation – to cross the gap between ambitious policy aims and their
effective realization in practice.22
Several perspectives inform the Article’s approach. The first is my
experience working inside competition agencies. From 1979 into 1983, I
was a junior attorney in one of the FTC’s planning units and for nine months
was an attorney advisor to a commissioner. I served as the FTC’s General
Counsel from June 2001 through September 2004 and as a commissioner
from January 2006 through September 2011.23 From 2014 to the present, I
have been a Non-Executive Director of the United Kingdom’s Competition
and Markets Authority (CMA). Since 1990, I have advised competition
authorities in over fifty countries on matters involving organization and
management. Collectively, these experiences have highlighted for me how
much competition agency effectiveness depends on the availability and

22. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 267–68 (1971) (“If analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve
desired policy outcomes, . . . we shall have to find ways of thinking harder about the
problem of ‘implementation,’ that is, the path between preferred solution and actual
performance of the government.”); see also ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK – WHAT
HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 3 (2008) [hereinafter Reforms at
Risk] (“General interest reforms are frequently adopted with great fanfare, but their success
simply cannot be taken for granted. . . . Indeed, sustaining reforms against the threats of
reversal and erosion may be even tougher than winning the reforms’ adoption in the first
place.”).
23. My periods of service at the FTC largely coincided with eras in which
commentators have argued that the FTC, and the U.S. federal antitrust enforcement system
generally, performed badly. Although I am not particularly fond of the condemnation
sometimes visited upon the U.S. regime and the FTC in particular, I welcome a deeper
examination of decisions the Commission took during these and other periods. In this
Article, I do not argue the merits of the modern normative assessments of U.S. antitrust
enforcement or the wisdom of proposals for reform. Instead, I focus on the soundness of the
positive assumptions that run throughout the modern debate, and I point to respects in which
the agencies themselves could benefit from better data collection and analysis, regardless of
how the process of reform unfolds.
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application of reliable data about past enforcement activity. In a number of
places, the Article draws directly upon those experiences.24
The second perspective comes from my experience as an academic
researcher. I have worked on a variety of projects that required the
preparation of data sets on enforcement activity.25 I have seen first-hand the
difficulties associated with developing a basic positive account of what
competition agencies such as the DOJ and the FTC have done over time.
Gaps and inconsistencies in how competition agencies report activity
abound, and it can be treacherous to simply rely on aggregate data or broad
generalizations that appear in other papers and not to examine the underlying
material that provides the basis for such data or general claims about
enforcement activity.26 Consequently, I usually have found it necessary to
construct data sets largely from scratch, using an agency’s reported data as a
starting point but supplementing it with a variety of additional research
techniques. Since 2011, I have been involved in a research project to
document major institutional characteristics for the world’s national
competition agencies. 27 This project also has revealed extraordinary
challenges in acquiring reliable information on what would seem to be, at
first glance, fairly basic matters of agency design. I have benefitted
enormously from conversations with other researchers with similar
interests,28 and I am inspired by the exceptional results that some research
24. See especially infra Section III (describing author’s experiences in the late 1970s
and early 1980s as a junior attorney in the Planning Office of the FTC’s Bureau of
Competition).
25. In 2003 I published an article that examined trends in federal antitrust enforcement
from 1960 to the early 2000s. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S.
Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003) [hereinafter Modern
Evolution]. The study required building data sets on DOJ and FTC activity largely from
scratch.
26. In an article published thirty years ago, I confidently wrote: “From 1981 to 1988,
the Reagan enforcement agencies brought no cases enforcing legal prohibitions against price
and nonprice vertical restraints.” William E. Kovacic, Comments and Observations, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 125 (1990). I based the claim on statements that had appeared in other
academic papers and not on my own examination of the federal agencies’ enforcement
record. The statement was incorrect, as I later discovered in studying DOJ and FTC activity
that took place during the early 1980s. The FTC had issued five vertical restraints consent
decrees during the Reagan administration – not a large number, but an amount unmistakably
greater than “no cases.” Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 460–61.
27. For a description of these project and initial presentation of results, see William E.
Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining
Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2016)
[hereinafter Lifecyles] (discussing institutional designs and predicates that facilitate effective
competition law implementation).
28. I am especially grateful to Professor Tim Büthe, who has been instrumental in
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teams have achieved as a result of diligent, persistent efforts over the course
of several years to prepare data sets on competition agency activity.29
A third and related perspective comes from researchers who have used
interdisciplinary approaches to improve understanding of what competition
agencies have done and to enhance the interpretation of their work. Two
areas of endeavor stand out. The first is a growing effort to incorporate
historical analysis into the formulation of contemporary regulatory policy.
This is hardly a new subject of interest for academics and policy makers.30
In recent years, there have been a number of notable efforts to bring together
professional historians and legal scholars in collaborative efforts to
understand antitrust and other forms of regulatory policy in their historical
context, and ultimately, to engage public officials more intensively in a
process that Professors Richard Neustadt and Ernest May call “thinking in
time-streams” by “imagining the future as it may be when it becomes the
past——with some intelligible continuity but richly complex and able to
surprise.”31 The current generation of multi-disciplinary research projects
and events (drawing not only on history and law, but also economics,
political science, and public administration) has the promise to strengthen

drawing the attention of the academic community to the need to develop better data
reporting standards for competition law enforcement.
29. The most impressive of these efforts is Columbia Law School’s Comparative
Competition Law (“CCL”) program, headed by Professor Anu Bradford. The Columbia
project has assembled highly useful data sets on enforcement work by over 100 competition
agencies and generously has placed these data sets into the public domain at
comparativecompetitionlaw.org [https://perma.cc/AP8R-GJFC]. Professor Bradford and
various colleagues have authored a number of informative publications that present results
from the CCL project. See, e.g., ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE
EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE WORLD (2020) (detailing how EU remains influential in
shaping the world through the “Brussels Effect,” its unilateral power to regulate global
markets). Dean Theodore Kovaleff’s studies of federal antitrust enforcement provide other
examples of how painstaking efforts to assemble a good data set can improve the assessment
of policy making. For example, in his study of DOJ Antitrust Division enforcement during
the Eisenhower administration, Dean Kovaleff examined each merger reviewed by the
Antitrust Division from 1953 through 1960. His published account of the Antitrust
Division’s program in this period includes an appendix with digests of all merger decisions.
THEODORE PHILIP KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER
ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST POLICY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 169–270 (1980).
30. See Edward J. Balleisen & Elizabeth K. Brake, Historical Perspective and Better
Regulatory Governance: An Agenda for Institutional Reform, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 222
(2014) (exploring how a more sustained historical perspective might improve regulatory
decision-making).
31. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY
FOR DECISION-MAKERS 253–54 (1986).
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the government’s formulation of competition policy.32
A second area is the application of the tools of operations research and
data analytics to the development of public antitrust enforcement programs.33
Among other techniques, these disciplines study past experience to identify
and understand important phenomena. Insights gained from operations
research and data analytics can be applied, in turn, to refine existing
programs and devise new strategies for addressing observed problems. As
noted below, 34 the broader application of operations research and data
analytics to antitrust big data could provide competition agencies with a
stronger basis to set priorities and choose specific projects to accomplish
their aims – for example, in the development of programs to detect,
prosecute, and deter cartels.35
The Article is organized as follows. Part I presents the strengths and
weaknesses of using data on law enforcement as a measure of the quality of
competition agency performance. Part II discusses recurring weaknesses in
the positive assumptions that have supported normative assessments about
U.S. antitrust enforcement since the late 1960s, when the federal antitrust
agencies last began a litigation program to deconcentrate major sectors of
the U.S. economy. 36 This part also reviews how weaknesses in positive
analysis can distort decisions about what antitrust agencies should do in the
future. Part III considers how an antitrust agency’s inadequate awareness of
what it has done previously can diminish its effectiveness. This part presents
a case study based upon my experiences as a junior attorney at the FTC in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Part IV proposes an approach for keeping
score regarding the enforcement of competition laws. It draws upon the
32. A small sample of relevant activities include the Tobin Foundation’s research
program on Antimonopoly and American Democracy and workshops convened by the
Harvard Business School on the history of economic regulation.
33. A particularly instructive example is the work of Professors Robert Marshall and
Leslie Marx. See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF
COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012) (examining collusive behavior; exploring
what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected). In this
volume, Professors Marshall and Marx derive informative observations about the formation
and operation of cartels from their study of the published decisions of the European
Commission in cartel prosecutions.
34. See infra Section IV.D (examining how better data analytics and operations
research can improve antitrust agency priority-setting and project selection)
35. See, e.g., Kovacic et al., Serial Collusion, supra note 20, at 301–13, 339–48
(identifying persistent patterns of collusive behavior by certain multi-product firms and
deriving policy recommendations for improving detection and deterrence).
36. This program is described in Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 4, at 1119–
20 (describing antitrust initiatives between late 1960s and early 1980s for federal antitrust
agencies to undertake cases to restructure concentrated industries).
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observations of Parts I-III to identify the types of data collection and
information management that could improve modern policy debates and
strengthen agency decision making. This part also draws upon previous
work that proposes improvements in data reporting by competition
agencies.37 Part V examines specific institutional measures that the FTC, the
DOJ, and other competition agencies could adopt to improve policy making
by strengthening data sets on past activity. This part includes a discussion
of how the reconstruction of past enforcement decisions can provide a useful
basis for guiding DOJ and FTC decisions in the future. This part sets out
practical steps that an agency can take to apply the framework suggested in
this Article. Part VI concludes.
I. THE AMBIGUOUS, DISPUTED SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA ON ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
Discussions about the adequacy of public antitrust enforcement often
turn at some point to the numbers. Assessments of the programs of the DOJ
Antitrust Division, the FTC, and other competition authorities often invoke
data on the volume and type of cases the agencies have brought in a given
period, as well as data on the monetary sanctions imposed on corporate
offenders.38
A major illustration of the centrality of enforcement data to the
assessment of competition agencies appears in the annual rankings of
competition agencies published by the Global Competition Review
(“GCR”). 39 First issued in 2001, the GCR survey evaluates the world’s
leading competition agencies (roughly 40 agencies out of a global total of
about 130 jurisdictions today)40 chiefly by reference to how the authorities
37. William E. Kovacic, Hugh M. Hollman & Patricia Grant, How Does Your
Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETITION J. 25 (2011) [hereinafter Measure
Up].
38. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Politics and Partisanship in U.S. Federal Antitrust
Enforcement, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 698–702 (2014) [hereinafter Politics and
Partisanship] (describing use of enforcement data by commentators to evaluate different
periods of federal antitrust enforcement); Kadhim Shubber, Antitrust prosecutions in US fall
to lowest level since 1970s, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2018, at 4 (discussing trends in Justice
Department enforcement).
39. The GCR is a United Kingdom-based organization that provides coverage of
competition policy news, publishes reports, and organizes conferences. Global Competition
Review, https://globalcompetitionreview.com [https://perma.cc/592P-VY4P] (last visited
Oct. 15, 2020).
40. Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton, Christopher Megaw & Nathaniel Sokol,
Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative Competition Law and
Enforcement Data Sets, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 411 (2019); Kovacic & Lopez-
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have enforced their competition laws during the previous year. 41 The
survey’s results depend heavily on the volume of cases initiated, success or
failure achieved in litigation, and the type of remedies attained, with an
emphasis on the total amount of monetary sanctions imposed.42 The GCR
staff also issues a survey that asks each competition agency to describe its
enforcement accomplishments during the ranking period, and the magazine
interviews lawyers and economists for their views about how the competition
agencies in their jurisdictions have performed. 43 Before publication, the
agencies receive a draft of the assessment and have an opportunity to discuss
the tentative results and, in some cases, argue for a better grade.
The GCR survey is the preeminent rating of competition agency
performance. It strongly influences the views of academics, enforcers, and
practitioners about the quality of individual competition systems. 44
Competition agencies often grumble about the survey results and, at least
internally, criticize the GCR’s findings, yet they (and their governments) take
the GCR ratings seriously and sometimes use them as a performance
benchmark.45
In its most recent annual survey, issued in August 2020, the GCR
evaluated 41 of the world’s competition agencies.46 Following its customary
practice, the publication assigned stars to each agency – five for “elite”
agencies and one for the merely adequate. Since the survey first appeared in
2001, only one competition agency has received the elite, five-star rating
Galdos, Lifecyles, supra note 27, at 85–86.
41. On its website, the Global Competition Review notes, “We scrutinise information
and data supplied by the competition authorities and from our daily reporting, while also
speaking with lawyers and economists for an additional steer on the quality of an agency’s
work in their jurisdiction.” Available at https://shop.globalconpetitionreivew.com/products/
rating-enforcement-2020 [https://perma.cc/X9TA-G6BN]. With greater frequency over the
past decade, the GCR assessments of individual agencies have included some discussion of
how the agencies have used non-litigation tools, such as market studies, to make
competition policy. GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, RATING ENFORCEMENT 2020, https://glo
balcompetitionreview.com/survey/rating-enforcement/2020 [https://perma.cc/Y5RU-WQE
Z], (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. I cannot offer a rigorous proof for this assertion. I base it mainly upon my
conversations over the past twenty years with academics, practitioners, and government
officials whose competition authorities the GCR survey has rated. I have followed the
survey results with particular interest during by time at the FTC from 2001-2004 and 20062011 (the period in which the survey first appeared) and since 2014 as a Non-executive
Director with the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority.
45. I base this observation on many conversations I have had with agency leaders since
the GCR first published its rankings in 2001.
46. GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, RATING ENFORCEMENT 2020, supra note 41.
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every year: the FTC.47 Once again, in the August 2020 survey, the FTC
received the elite five-star rating.48 As in the past, the GCR’s most recent
annual assessment of the FTC was not uniformly laudatory (the August 2020
evaluation offers a number of criticisms and cautions),49 but the overall grade
is the highest available, and the FTC’s performance since the survey’s
inception has been unmatched. 50 One might infer from the GCR annual
rankings, viewed in isolation, that the FTC is the world’s best-performing
competition agency in this century and certainly at least as good as any other.
The FTC is one half of the U.S. federal antitrust enforcement
partnership that includes the DOJ Antitrust Division.51 Though not as stellar
as the FTC’s ranking, the DOJ’s GCR ratings often have placed the
Department among the five-star elite institutions and never worse than the
“very good” second category of four stars. 52 GCR does not assemble a
composite grade to compare the U.S. federal antitrust enforcement system to
the regimes of other jurisdictions, such as the European Union. Devising a
composite U.S. grade that combined the GCR’s separate evaluations of the
DOJ and the FTC, one might reasonably infer from the GCR rankings, seen
in isolation, that the U.S. federal enforcement system would rank no worse
than tied for first among all jurisdictions over the past twenty years.
Notwithstanding the GCR’s admonitions to both U.S. agencies about areas
for improvement, there would be no question that the U.S. federal
enforcement system on the whole performs at an exceptionally high level.
As suggested above,53 that is not how everybody perceives the status
quo today. One notable, influential strand of commentary denounces the
FTC as a badly deficient institution.
In frequently harsh terms,
commentators scorn the agency for not using its competition mandate more

47. This observation is based on the author’s review of each GCR Rating Enforcement
survey published from 2001 onward.
48. Three other agencies also received five stars for the latest rating period: The
European Commission’s Competition Directorate, France’s Autorite de la Concurrence, and
German’s Bundeskartellamt. GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, RATING ENFORCEMENT 2020.
49. GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, RATING ENFORCEMENT 2020, supra note 41.
50. This observation is based on the author’s review of each GCR Rating Enforcement
survey from 2001 to the present.
51. See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in High Tech Industries: Improving the Federal
Antitrust Joint Venture, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1097 (2012) (describing the allocation of
tasks and relationship between the two federal antitrust agencies).
52. This observation is based on the author’s review of the GCR’s annual rankings from
2001 to the present.
53. See supra notes 8 and 15 and accompanying text (collecting contemporary
commentary that argues U.S. federal antitrust enforcement is seriously inadequate).
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aggressively.54 Their assessment of the DOJ is no more favorable.55 Where
the GCR sees two decades of superior performance, contemporary criticism
of the U.S. antitrust agencies perceives a persistent pattern of grievous policy
lapses dating back to the late 1970s.56 In its strongest form, the overarching
proposal of the modern critique is not to tamper with the system at the edges,
but to carry out a “root and branch reconstruction.”57
What accounts for these drastically divergent assessments of the
performance of the DOJ and the FTC? To some extent, the divergence
reflects opposing views of the proper purposes of U.S. antitrust enforcement.
The severely negative assessment often comes from commentators who
believe that mainstream U.S. antitrust policy adheres to a cramped vision
that regards the interests of consumers to be paramount in the interpretation
and application of the antitrust laws.58 For such observers, law enforcement
faithful to the egalitarian aims of the antitrust statutes would seek to
safeguard the interest of citizens not only as purchasers of goods and services
but also as workers, owners of small and medium enterprises, and
participants in the democratic process.59 By this view, a program premised
on protecting consumer interests to the exclusion of other objectives is
inherently deficient.
The divergent perspectives about the goals of the U.S. antitrust system,
sketched above, are an important source of difference in modern debates
54. Id. Various observers have offered similarly negative assessments of the FTC’s
exercise of its consumer protection and privacy powers. See, e.g., MAURICE E. STUCKE &
ARIEL EZRACHI, COMPETITION OVERDOSE – HOW FREE MARKET MYTHOLOGY TRANSFORMED
US FROM CITIZEN KINGS TO MARKET SERVANTS 217-18 (2020) (criticizing the FTC for
lenient fines and punishment against big tech firms for their privacy violations).
55. See STUCKE & EZRACHI, supra note 54, at 232 (criticizing DOJ and FTC for
challenging forms of collaboration that would assist Uber and Lyft drivers “to secure fair
wages”); TEPPER & HEARN, MYTH OF CAPITALISM, supra note 9, at 162 (“the Department of
Justice now essentially works to serve the interests of companies”).
56. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (describing criticism of modern U.S.
antitrust enforcement as badly inadequate).
57. Vaheesan, New Gilded Age, supra note 12.
58. See DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED, supra note 11, at 285 (“The antitrust apparatus -- in
government, in academia, in the establishment – has built a fortress around itself, a
cloistered world where nothing is inherently wrong with the economy, where there’s been
no rampant inequality, stunting of innovation, degradation in quality of service, or
concentration in political power, and where there aren’t even any monopolies around that
could have possibly instigated such bad outcomes.”).
59. See Russell Brandom, The Anti-Monopoly Case Against Google: A Conversation
with Open Markets’ Barry Lynn, THE VERGE (Sept. 5, 2017, 2:55pm EDT), https://www.the
verge.com/2017/9/5/16243868/google-monopoly-antitrust-open-markets-barry-lynn [https://
perma.cc/NX35-DBJH] (arguing that the purposes of antitrust laws are not only to protect
consumers, but also to protect democratic institutions and communities).
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about competition policy. At the same time, the competing groups of policy
advocates share a common methodology: the competing assessments of
agency performance often draw inferences from the positive record of DOJ
and FTC activity. Commentators often point to data on the volume and types
of enforcement, and the remedies obtained through litigation or settlement,
to support their normative conclusions.60
Two things stand out in assessments of the U.S. antitrust system that
rely upon the positive record of DOJ and FTC enforcement. First, there
appears to be no common understanding among commentators about what
the federal agencies have done, nor is there agreement about the doctrinal or
policy importance of individual enforcement efforts.61 The academics and
practitioners whose views are influential in the GCR survey and the
commentators who berate the DOJ and the FTC today seem to make
dissimilar assumptions about what enforcement activities the federal
agencies have undertaken and why they have exercised their prosecutorial
discretion as they have 62 – not a good starting point for a well-informed
discussion about the quality of agency performance.
The extensive reliance on positive data about enforcement activity
raises a second important question. Are the volume of cases and the amount
of fines imposed good measures of agency performance? The amount of
antitrust enforcement activity can be both meaningful and meaningless.
Sustaining some baseline level of enforcement activity is important if the
agency is to be seen as credible to business managers and legitimate in the
eyes of elected officials who adopt the laws and supply public resources to
implement them.63 In deciding whether to comply with the law, business
decision makers are apt to ask their advisors what happens if they fail to
comply, and how vigorously do the public authorities enforce the legal
command at issue. In the absence of periodic, well-publicized episodes of
enforcement, the sense of urgency to abide by the law diminishes.64 The
60. See infra notes 174-183 (describing critical commentary that invokes data on
federal enforcement involving mergers and single-firm conduct)
61. See infra notes 171-185 (discussing divergent understandings of what the federal
antitrust agencies have done in the modern era and the motivations that guided the exercise
of the power to prosecute).
62. As indicated in Section II.B. below, there are remarkable gaps in the knowledge of
competition law specialists and business law commentators regarding the cases that the DOJ
and the FTC have filed and what types of economic harms the agencies sought to rectify.
63. See William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies
Signal Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 247–48 (2015) (“At least in some areas of
antitrust law, a minimum level of activity may be vital to preserve the credibility and
reputation of the competition agency.”).
64. See D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners
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failure to enforce the law sufficiently leaves victims exposed to injury and
undermines deterrence. As discussed in more detail in Section III below, the
maintenance and study of accurate data sets on an agency’s positive
enforcement record can enable public officials to make better judgments
about prioritization and project selection, and can facilitate meaningful
monitoring by external observers, such as legislative bodies, media
organizations, advocacy bodies, and academic researchers.65
At the same time, activity levels cannot confidently be taken as proxies
for effectiveness.66 Speeches by competition agency leaders often will say
their agencies have been “very busy” in bringing cases and imposing fines.67
The desired implication is that activity is a good measure of accomplishment.
Yet the real question, often difficult to answer, is whether the agency has
been productive in improving economic performance to the benefit of
society.68
Recitals of the numbers of cases filed and the volume of fines imposed
– especially large fines levied on well-known large firms – are widely
accepted tests of effectiveness, yet they often provide little insight into the
impact of an agency’s work or the wisdom of its resource allocation
decisions. An agency that runs up large numbers of total cases may be
pursuing insignificant cases, or it may be making commitments that greatly
exceed its capacity to bring matters to a successful conclusion. Big fines,
even multi-billion dollar penalties, may be impressive at first glance, but they
Really Think About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 203 (2012) (“In the individual
cartelists’ cost-benefit calculation, the lack of public awareness of cartels and lack of
corresponding moral outrage for cartel crimes reduces the cost of participation in a cartel.”).
65. See William E. Kovacic, Deciding What to Do and How to Do It: Prioritization,
Project Selection, and Competition Agency Effectiveness, 13 COMPETITION L. REV. 9 (June
2018) (exploring how the competition agencies can implement policy more effectively by
raising their skills at prioritization and project selection).
66. See William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5(1) COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 131–33 (Spring 2009)
[hereinafter Horizontal Merger Enforcement], available at https://lawprofessors.typepad.co
m/files/kovacic.final.pdf [https://perma.cc/94PH-UL9N] (arguing that activity level is a
feeble proxy to assess effectiveness of antitrust oversight; instead, criteria including whether
the policies improve economic performance, whether the competition system minimizes
implementation cost, and whether the system has committed to reassessment and
improvement, should be adopted).
67. Kovacic et al., Measure Up, supra note 37, at 27–28.
68. Kovacic et al., Measure Up, supra note 37, at 27–28.
68. In his inaugural address in 2009, President Obama put the point this way: “The
question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it
works.” President Barack Obama, U.S. Presidential Inaugural Address (2009), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Obama_Inaugural_Address_01
2009.html [https://perma.cc/M2XH-ZRXK?type=image].
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may not make much of a dent in the incentives that shape behavior of firms
that net billions in profits in a single month.69 A preoccupation with bringing
high-profile cases against larger enterprises also can lead an agency to forego
smaller cases that can serve as valuable prototypes for advancing analytical
or doctrinal concepts that, if endorsed in judicial decisions, expand
enforcement possibilities for the future.70
The single-minded focus on litigation as the central instrument of policy
making also can blind an agency to the possibility in some instances that
lawsuits are inferior to other policy making strategies. Non-litigation policy
instruments such as rulemaking or the filing of reports that advocate changes
in the existing policy framework can yield valuable results that would be
unattainable through lawsuits alone.71 Moreover, an agency driven to lift
69. Some firms may regard the seemingly large fine as an acceptable price to pay for
the gains that flow from the challenged conduct. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to
Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 424–25 (2011) (“deterrence is likely to be highly
inadequate when large overcharges occur since fines will be less than the firms’ profits”).
For example, this concern has arisen in connection with monetary sanctions the European
Commission imposed upon participants in a cartel to raise the price of heavy trucks.
Kovacic et. al., Serial Collusion, supra note 20, at 314–15 (discussing EC fines against
participants in heavy trucks cartel). The issue also has clouded the $5 billion settlement
achieved by the FTC to resolve alleged violations by Facebook of a privacy consent decree
that the FTC entered against the company in 2012. Margaret Harding McGill & Nancy
Scola, FTC approves $5B Facebook settlement that Democrats label “chump change”,
Politico (July 12, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/12/facebook-ftc-fine-5billion-718953 [https://perma.cc/7ME6-STNA].
70. Small cases can make big law. An examination of the evolution of antitrust
enforcement programs reveals a number of instances in which cases involving smaller
defendants and smaller volumes of commerce generated doctrine that paved the way for
successful pursuit of cases involving large defendants and massive economic stakes. A
noteworthy example is Lorain Journal Co. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 143 (1951). The DOJ’s
successful prosecution of the Lorain Journal case in the late 1940s and early 1950s yielded
precedent that provided the foundation for the theory of harm in the Microsoft
monopolization case in the late 1990s. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (per curiam). See also ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT
ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)
(discussing the significance of Lorain Journal to the formulation of the theory of harm in
Microsoft). Another important example is Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366
(1973). The government’s victory in Otter Tail supplied a crucial basis for the DOJ to
undertake its challenge against AT&T in the 1970s for illegal monopolization. PETER
TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM 108–90 (1987). The AT&T litigation resulted in a
settlement in 1982 that required the break-up of nation’s leading telecommunications
company. STEPHEN COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 172–89,
211–53, 291–323 (1986).
71. Notable FTC successes in the 2000s in applying non-litigation policy tools include
the Commission’s publication of studies involving entry by generic drug producers, the
competitive effects of the patent rights-granting process, and competition in health care.
William E. Kovacic, Measuring What Matters: The Federal Trade Commission and
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case counts is prone to underinvest in the policy research and development
that sets the foundation for strong cases and other regulatory interventions.72
II. HOW THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE ANALYSIS AFFECTS OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATION OF THE U.S. ANTITRUST
REGIME
Since the late 1960s, debates about the appropriate direction of
federal antitrust policy have been shaped by two narratives anchored in
depictions about the history, more recent and more distant, of the law
enforcement programs of the DOJ and the FTC. As discussed in Section
II.B. below, the excessive and misdirected enforcement activity narrative
portrays federal enforcement as out of control in its tendency to mount
mindless assaults on socially beneficial business behavior and devote too few
resources to meritorious cases. The inadequate and misdirected enforcement
activity narrative scorns the agencies for doing too little to curb harmful
business conduct and bringing too many cases that damage small businesses
and individual entrepreneurs.
Both narratives frequently have supported their arguments about the
quality of federal enforcement policy with two types of positive analysis.
The first type consists of express or implied references to enforcement data.73
The commentary invokes enforcement data much in the way that enthusiasts
of sport recite statistics when debating the merits of individual performers or
teams. The second type of positive analysis describes the motives that
animated the enforcement choices of the DOJ and the FTC. The discussion
of motives might be dismissed as mere surmise -- a speculative interpretation
of agency actions rather than a verifiable statement of why agencies acted as
they did. In a number of cases, however, commentators present matter-offact statements that assign motives with a degree of assurance that invites the
reader to conclude that the motives attributed to the agencies indeed guided
their decisions. 74 In short, the excessive enforcement and inadequate
Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 861
(2005) [hereinafter Measuring What Matters].
72. Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 165, 182 (2005).
73. See, e.g., APPLEBAUM, ECONOMISTS’ HOUR, supra note 13, at 157 (quoting George
Stigler as saying “antitrust laws do far more harm than good and that we would be better off
if we didn’t have them at all”; adding that “Public policy has moved in that direction over
the last two decades. Regulators brought a dwindling number of enforcement actions;
courts kept chipping away at the law.”).
74. For example, following the Justice Department’s recent complaint against Google
for illegal monopolization, Professor Tim Wu observed “Others may urge us to trust that
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enforcement narratives rely extensively on positive statements about what
the agencies did and why they did it.
In a striking number of instances, the two narratives make positive
statements that diverge materially from actual experience or require
elaborate qualifications that, if presented, would reduce the force of the
narratives’ normative case for change. In some cases, the recital of
enforcement history is manifestly contrary to fact. In others, the historical
story contains a degree of exaggeration that renders it misleading and erodes
the positive foundation on which the narrator’s normative recommendations
stand. Both narratives suffer from their tendency to stretch or spin past
events in search of what Professor Daniel Ernst has called “a useable past.”75
The focus in the discussion below is on advertent or inadvertent
misrepresentations of the positive record of federal antitrust enforcement.
Erroneous portrayals of what happened can come in two forms: an
affirmative presentation of data that is contrary to fact, or the omission of
material information that makes a statement misleading.76 The analysis here
does not take issue with statements of opinion that rest upon an accurate
portrayal of the positive record. Thus, the article does not quarrel here with
large companies like Google are fundamentally well-intentioned. That view became
dominant among antitrust officials during George W. Bush’s administration and has now
prevailed for 20 years.” Tim Wu, Google, You Can’t Buy Your Way Out of This, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/opinion/google-lawsuit-antitru
st.html [https://perma.cc/HJ4R-TQFV]. For what it’s worth, I served as a senior official at
the FTC in seven of the eight years of the George W. Bush administration (from 2001-2004
as General Counsel and 2006-2009 as a member of the Commission). In that period, I
attended hundreds of meetings inside the agency on antitrust enforcement matters. I never
heard an FTC employee, including its most senior leaders, assert that the agency should
decline to initiate an investigation or bring a case because the companies in question were
“fundamentally well-intentioned.” Nor, in the course of numerous conversations did I hear
a DOJ official say that enforcement was inappropriate, in specific case or as a general guide
to policy making, because the firms at issue were “fundamentally well-intentioned.” I do
recall intense deliberations with the FTC and debates with DOJ officials about whether the
business conduct in question damaged competition without regard to the subjective state of
mind of the commercial actors.
75. Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 883
(1990).
76. The omission of relevant information can present a false image of an organization’s
work. Years ago in London’s West End, I visited a store that specialized in books and
memorabilia involving transportation. I recall seeing a poster that celebrated the history of
the Cunard cruise line and its predecessor companies. In the center of the poster was the
image of one of Cunard’s famous modern ships, and the border contained images of famous
liners from the earlier days of Cunard and companies, such as the White Star Line, that
Cunard had absorbed. The gallery of great vessels on the border had two noteworthy
omissions: the Lusitania and the Titanic. It is difficult to tell the history of the Cunard
family of cruise lines without mentioning these tragic steamships.
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a commentator who correctly describes an agency’s record of cases
involving claims of illegal monopolization and concludes that the agency’s
program involving dominant firms was deficient because the agency should
have prosecuted more of these cases. Statements of opinion that assert or
assume inaccurate representations of the positive record are the subject of
criticism here – for example, a conclusion that makes an erroneous claim
about agency activity to support a conclusion that the agency performed
badly or successfully.77 Thus, the analysis emphasizes positive statements
that are contrary to fact or normative conclusions that rely upon erroneous
positive statements.
The discussion here also focuses on what might be called material
misrepresentations of the positive record. Some degree of simplification is
inevitable in all narration; absolute precision is unattainable, even through
the exercise of scrupulous care. As Professor Tim Büthe observes:
[I]t is more meaningful to endorse a good narrative work as
“plausible,” “persuasive,” or “compelling” – as seems to be the
practice among historians – rather than “true” or “right,” though
we certainly may find some narrative work that is poor and even
plain “wrong,” such as when its interpretation is marred by logical
inconsistencies or makes incorrect assertions about the chronology
of events.78
This Article comes down hard on imprecision where the narrative
makes categorical and incorrect statements of positive activity as a way of
building a case for strong statements about the quality of competition agency
performance in a specific period. It is not overly concerned with
inaccuracies that appear in accounts that carefully qualify their
representations about the positive world and note potential frailties in the
assembly and presentation of data.

77. Roughly speaking, the Article employs a distinction that the FTC uses in its
regulation of commercial advertising. See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Policy
Statement on Advertising Substantiation (Nov. 23, 1984), available at https://www.ftc.gov/p
ublic-statements/1984/11/ftc-policy-statement-regarding-advertising-substantiation [https://
perma.cc/8TAA-566D] (stating policy guidelines regarding advertising substantiation)
Thompson Medical Company Inc. v Federal Trade Commission, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The FTC generally will not challenge a firm for making what is plainly a statement
of opinion (“puffery”) about the quality of its product, such as a restaurant that claims to
serve “Philadelphia’s Best Cheesesteak.” The FTC gets involved when the firm asserts a
factual basis for its claim, as when the restaurant declares “Rated by Philadelphians as the
City’s Best Cheesesteak.”
78. Tim Büthe, Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of
Narratives as Evidence, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481, 488 (2002).
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A. Excessive and Misdirected Enforcement Activity: Two Narratives
from the Late 1970s
From the mid- to late 1930s through the early- to mid-1970s, the reach
of the U.S. antitrust system expanded dramatically.79 The courts endorsed
relatively expansive interpretations of the antitrust laws,80 and the federal
agencies undertook a number of ambitious enforcement programs.81 In the
late 1970s, the extension of intervention in the courts and in the agencies
attracted strong criticism from observers whose normative assessments
rested upon strong claims about what the antitrust system had done. The
discussion below considers two important examples.
ROBERT BORK’S ANTITRUST PARADOX
In 1978, in his formative critique of the U.S. antitrust system, Robert
Bork wrote that “[o]ne of the uses of history is to free us of a falsely imagined
past.”82 Judge Bork’s treatise often invoked history to make the case for a
sweeping retrenchment of antitrust policy. 83 He argued that “[t]he
conventional indicia of legislative intent overwhelmingly support the
conclusion that the antitrust laws should be interpreted as designed for the
sole purpose of forwarding consumer welfare”84 to the exclusion of other
aims, such as the maintenance of an egalitarian business environment in
which smaller enterprises could prosper.85 To Judge Bork, the congressional
endorsement of “consumer welfare” as the single-minded aim of antitrust

79. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic
and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43, 49 (2000); see also Barak Orbach, The
Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1450 (2019) (describing this
period as “the Fairness Era”).
80. Notable landmark decisions that extended the zone of antitrust liability in this
period included U.S. v Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967); Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
81. Among the most significant federal enforcement programs was the effort by the
DOJ and the FTC from the late 1960s through the 1970s and into the early 1980s to
deconcentrate major sectors of the economy. See infra notes 97-99, 116 and accompanying
text (describing federal enforcement measures from 1969 through the 1970s to dissolve
single-firm monopolies and tight oligopolies).
82. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX – A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 15
(1978) [hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX].
83. See, e.g., id. at 50-89 (describing goals of Congress in adopting the antitrust laws
and judicial interpretation of those goals).
84. Id. at 71.
85. Id. at 60–61.
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law meant that judges should evaluate the legality of business behavior under
the Sherman Act, 86 the Clayton Act (as amended by the Celler-Kefauver
Act),87 and the Federal Trade Commission Act88 according to its effect on
allocative efficiency.89
Since the early 1980s, numerous academics in fields such as history and
law have retraced Judge Bork’s historical argument about the original
congressional intent behind the antitrust statutes and disputed its positive
account of the legislative deliberations leading to adoption of the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts. 90 A large body of
historically-oriented scholarship regards the consumer welfare thesis (and its
implication that allocative efficiency is all that counts in antitrust law) as
unsupportable.91 An important strand of analysis demonstrated how Judge
Bork’s positive account of the origins of the U.S. antitrust statutes ignored
key elements of context that are necessary to understand the aims of
Congress from 1890 (when the Sherman Act was adopted) to 1914 (when
the Clayton and FTC Acts were passed).92 As Professor James May has
observed, if one considers the enactment of the antitrust laws in their fuller
86. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7.
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27.
88. 15 U.S.C. §45 (proscribing “unfair methods of competition”).
89. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 82, at 90–115.
90. An especially influential beginning of this critical literature was Robert Lande’s
study of the legislative histories of the antitrust statutes. Professor Lande demonstrated that
the legislative debates displayed no overriding concern with “consumer welfare” and instead
advanced a variety of other policy objectives, including the attainment of important wealth
distribution aims. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,93
(1982) (concluding that the chief congressional aim in adopting the antitrust laws was not to
safeguard allocative efficiency but rather to prevent unfair transfers of wealth from
consumers to producers).
91. In a representative assessment authored less than a decade after the ANTITRUST
PARADOX appeared, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp observed that “the legislative histories of
the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything resembling a dominant concern for
economic efficiency.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 213, 249 (1985).
92. For an early, influential treatment of this point, see James May, Antitrust in the
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis,
1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 395 (1989) [hereinafter Formative Era] (offering a
caution relevant to Bork and other commentators who scan the legislative debates for
supportive passages and overlook the larger context in which these deliberations took
place). Professor May observed that efforts to use historical analysis to guide contemporary
policy development must stand upon sound positive foundations constructed from “[T]he
formulation and application of an approach reasonably faithful to the animating economic,
moral, and political concerns of [the] initial period of antitrust legislation and adjudication.”
Id. at 395.
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historical context, one sees that the formative legislation emerged from “a
powerful, widely-shared vision of a natural, rights-based political and
economic order that simultaneously tended to ensure opportunity, efficiency,
prosperity, justice, harmony, and freedom.”93
While many researchers have exposed (and continue to attack) the
frailties of the positive claims supporting Judge Bork’s interpretation of the
original antitrust statutes,94 another doubtful positive basis for the Antitrust
Paradox’s reform prescriptions has received less attention. Judge Bork
argued that serious failures in the institutions responsible for the formation
and implementation of antitrust policy – academia, the Congress, the courts,
the federal enforcement agencies, the business community and their agents
in the antitrust bar – had rendered the system dysfunctional and sent it out of
control.95 “[M]odern antitrust law,” he wrote, “has so decayed that the policy
is no longer intellectually respectable. Some of it is not respectable as law;
more of it is not respectable as economics; and . . . a great deal of antitrust
law is not even respectable as politics.”96
Judge Bork seemed to perceive that his argument for sweeping change
93. May, Formative Era, supra note 92, at 391.
94. Bork’s consumer welfare argument continues to attract criticism from scholars who
initiated the challenge to this interpretation in the 1980s, and it is the focus of critical
inquiry by a new generation of researchers. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its
Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2255 (2013); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The
Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 (2008). Modern advocates of far-reaching antitrust reforms
perceive that continued adherence to Bork’s consumer welfare vision by courts and
enforcement agencies is a formidable obstacle to the transformation of the U.S. competition
policy system. See, e.g., Lina Khan, The ideological Roots of America’s Market Power
Problem, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 960 (2018); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market
Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discontent, 11 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 234, 269–72, 277–79 (2017); Marshall Steinbaum, The Consumer Welfare
Standard Is an Outdated Holdover from a Discredited Economic Theory, ROOSEVELT
INSTITUTE (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/consumer-welfare-standardoutdated-holdover-discredited-economic-theory [https://perma.cc/AGW4-V77G]. Senator
Elizabeth Warren has drafted legislation that repudiates the consumer welfare standard as
proposed by Professor Bork and applied by the federal courts. Senator Elizabeth Warren,
Anti-Monopoly and Competition Restoration Act (Dec. 9, 2019) (draft legislation on file
with author). The recent report by the Majority Staff of the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law also proposed that Congress adopt
legislative reforms that would declare its intent that the antitrust laws encompass the
interests of citizens beyond their role as consumers. Majority Staff Report, supra note 7 at
391.
95. William E. Kovacic, Out of Control? Robert Bork’s Portrayal of the U.S. Antitrust
Enforcement System in the 1970s, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 857 (2014) [hereinafter Out of
Control].
96. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 82, at 418.
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might not be persuasive unless he fully discredited the regime as it stood in
1978. His apocalyptic narrative was supported with positive descriptions of
what the institutions of antitrust law had done and failed to do. With few
exceptions, the courts had ignored efficiency considerations and moved
doctrine in recklessly interventionist directions. 97 The antitrust agencies
likewise had brushed aside valid efficiency justifications for challenged
practices and craved power for its own sake, advancing enforcement theories
that gave the DOJ and the FTC ever greater power over the economy. 98
Judge Bork said Congress seemed poised to adopt new legislation that would
deconcentrate various American industries and inflict massive damage on
the U.S. economy.99 The business community, lacking a sense of common
cause to respond forcefully to these dangers, had offered feeble resistance to
FTC and DOJ expansionism.100 Abetted by interventionist legislators and
pliant courts, and unchecked by effective business resistance, the wellfocused and self-aggrandizing leadership and staff of the DOJ and the FTC
appeared destined to conquer new enforcement terrain without restraint. In
Judge Bork’s portrayal, the expansion of antitrust intervention had no
apparent boundaries.
Judge Bork’s dismal depiction of the U.S. regime omitted
developments that fit poorly with his depiction of institutions in crisis.101 To
look more carefully at contemporary trends would have forced a rethink of
the notion that the system was moving inexorably toward ever greater
intervention in the affairs of business. Judge Bork acknowledged that some
court decisions of the 1970s seemed tentatively to suggest a more cautious
judicial mood. He omitted discussion of other cases that, considered as a
group, would have indicated that momentum for increasingly broad, prointervention interpretations was dissipating.102 He also overlooked changes
in Congress that made the enactment of new legislation to restructure
American industry unlikely.103 The business community, which Judge Bork
depicted as timid and passive, instead had mounted a formidable campaign
– in litigation, advocacy before Congress, and in funding research that
highlighted the efficiency rationales of challenged conduct – to oppose the

97. Kovacic, Out of Control, supra note 95, at 860–62.
98. Id. at 862–64.
99. Id. at 859–60.
100. Id. at 864.
101. Daniel Crane, The New Crisis in Antitrust (?), 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (2020);
Kovacic, Out of Control, supra note 95, at 866-75.
102. Kovacic, Out of Control, supra note 95, at 868–72.
103. Id. at 867–68.
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ambitious de-concentration program of the federal agencies.104 In case after
case, the federal agencies faced powerful opposition from defense teams
consisting of the premier private law firms and economic consultants; in
many instances, the defendants tied the government in procedural knots or
achieved litigated victories on the merits.105 By accounting for developments
in the courts and in the academic commentary, the federal agencies also had
made moves to rein in their enforcement programs or to initiate the types of
cases, in some instances, that Judge Bork seemed to approve.106 By the late
1970s, the putatively invincible federal antitrust agencies, said to be bent on
acquiring power for its own sake and destined to expand the zone of antitrust
enforcement without limit, had begun a major retreat.
All of these developments were observable in 1978, especially for an
astute student of the U.S. antitrust system such as Robert Bork. Accounting
for them would have required Judge Bork to temper his catastrophe narrative
by acknowledging phenomena within the system that moderated
expansionism. After addressing the fuller body of developments –
presenting a more complete positive account of the state of the antitrust
regime – Judge Bork probably still would have concluded that major changes
in U.S. enforcement policy and jurisprudence were necessary. Yet these
policy prescriptions likely would have lacked the force provided by a
positive analysis that likened the U.S. antitrust institutions to a runaway train
filled with explosives.
THE POLITICAL ASSAULT ON THE FTC
From the late 1960s through the 1970s, the FTC pursued an
extraordinarily ambitious agenda of competition and consumer protection
matters.107 Significant antitrust litigation included challenges to dominant
firm misconduct and collective dominance, distribution practices, horizontal
restraints, and facilitating practices. 108 Many matters involved powerful
economic interests, 109 and in a number of cases the Commission sought
structural relief in the form of divestitures or the compulsory licensing of
104. Id. at 875.
105. Id. at 870–72.
106. Id. at 872–73.
107. See generally William E. Kovacic, “Competition Policy in Its Broadest Sense”:
Michael Pertschuk’s Chairmanship of the Federal Trade Commission 1977-1981, 60
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1269 (2019) [hereinafter Broadest Sense] (describing the FTC’s
pursuit of competition and consumer protection matters during the late 1960s through the
1970s).
108. Id. at 1283–86, 1303.
109. Id. at 1287–88.
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intellectual property.110 In 1974, the agency also initiated a program that
required certain large firms to provide “line-of-business” data concerning a
range of performance indicators.111
In the same period, the Commission used a mix of litigation and
rulemaking to transform its consumer protection agenda.112 Through policy
guidance and litigation, the agency introduced its advertising substantiation
program that required firms to have support for factual claims made in their
advertisements.113 The Commission initiated over twenty-five rulemaking
proceedings and promulgated final rules involving a broad collection of
product and service sectors.114
As a group, the FTC’s competition and consumer protection initiatives
aroused fierce opposition from the affected firms and industries, which
contested the agency’s actions in court and before Congress. 115 The
complaints of industry resonated with a large, powerful bipartisan coalition
of legislators116 who criticized the Commission’s activism, proposed various
measures to curb the agency’s authority,117 and ultimately adopted a number
of restrictions in The Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980
110. Id. at 1287.
111. Id. at 1284–85; FTC Resolution Requiring Annual Line of Business Reports from
Corporations, Aug. 2, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 30, 377 (1974). The development of the FTC’s
line of business program is examined in Note, The FTC’s Annual Line-of-Business
Reporting Program, 1975 DUKE L.J. 389.
112. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1288–91.
113. Federal Trade Commission (F.T.C.), Special Reports Relating to Advertising
Claims, 36 FED. REG. 12058 (June 24, 1971); Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
114. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1288–91; William MacLeod et al.,
Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in Competition
Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 953 & n.57 (2005).
115. William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 869, 895-97 (1988) [hereinafter Congress and the Federal Trade Commission]. See
also The Escalating Struggle Between the FTC and Business – Executives Openly Challenge
the Actions and Policies of the Newly Activist Agency, BUS. WK. 52, 53 (Dec. 13, 1976)
(describing the swelling of business opposition to the FTC’s program of the early-to mid1970s).
116. Most of the events described here took place from 1977 through 1980, when the
Democratic Party held the presidency (under the tenure of Jimmy Carter) and controlled
both houses of Congress. In the November 1980 elections, the Republicans gained the
White House and the Senate.
117. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: A Historical Perspective, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 63, 93-94 (Robert
MacKay, James C. Miller III & Bruce Yandle eds., 1987)(describing the restrictions on the
FTC’s powers various members of Congress proposed during this period); see also Michael
Denger, The Unfairness Standard and FTC Rulemaking: The Controversy over the Scope of
the Commission’s Authority, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 53 (1981)(same).
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(FTC Improvements Act).118 In 1980, bitter opposition to elements of the
FTC’s competition and consumer protection programs led Congress to allow
the FTC’s funding to lapse, forcing the agency to temporarily cease
operations. 119 Perhaps emboldened by the weak political support the
Commission enjoyed before 1981, when the Democrats controlled the White
House and both chambers of Congress, the Reagan administration briefly
resumed the assault on the agency’s funding. In January 1981, David
Stockman, Ronald Reagan’s first Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), launched a short-lived effort to eliminate funding for the
FTC’s competition policy program.120
The congressional and executive branch officials who criticized the
FTC in this period advanced two positive claims to justify recommendations
for withdrawing authority or funding for the Commission. One claim was
that the agency’s choice of competition and consumer protection programs
had contradicted congressional guidance about how the FTC should use its
authority and resources.121 Many legislators complained that the agency had
disregarded the legislature’s preferences and used its powers in ways that
Congress never contemplated to fall within the FTC’s remit.122 As Congress
considered bills in 1979 to limit the Commission’s powers, Congressman

118. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374 (1980) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
119. In 1980, the Commission ceased operations on May 1 owing to a lapse in its
funding. Merrill Brown, FTC Temporarily Closed in Budget Dispute, WASH. POST, May 1,
1980, at B1. During debates that led up to the congressional impasse over the
Commission’s funding, Representative Jimmy Quillen underscored the antipathy of many
legislators toward the agency, saying “the way to kill a rattlesnake is to cut its head off.
That is what we ought to do today.” 126 CONG. REC. H2196 (daily ed., Mar. 26, 1980)
(statement of Rep. James Quillen).
120. See FTC Commissioners Foresee Budget Cuts as Instant Doom for Competition
Programs, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Feb. 19, 1981, at A1 (describing the
Stockman budget proposal). Within weeks, OMB withdrew the proposal. Budget Cuts
Won’t Scrap FTC’s Competition Mission, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Mar. 5,
1981, at A4.
121. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight
of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 589–91, 664–68 (1982) [hereinafter
Congressional Oversight].
122. During debate over the measure ultimately adopted as The Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980, the principal Senate sponsors of the Act said the
FTC had failed to heed the policy guidance of Congress. 126 CONG. REC. S5676 (Daily
Edition, May 21, 1980) (statement of Sen. Wendell Ford); 126 CONG. REC. S5681 (daily ed.,
May 21, 1980) (statement of Sen. Howard Cannon). See also 121 CONG. REC. S15687 (daily
ed., Dec. 16, 1981) (statement of Senator James McClure)(stating “In recent years, we have
seen unprecedented efforts by the Commission to expand its activities into areas well
beyond those charted by Congress. It is time for Congress to curb these actions.”).
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William Frenzel captured the prevailing legislative mood:
It is bad enough to be counterproductive and therefore highly
inflationary, but the FTC compounds its sins by generally ignoring
the intent of our laws, and writing its own laws whenever the
whimsey strikes it . . .
Ignoring Congress can be a virtue, but the FTC’s excessive
nose-thumbing at the legislative branch has become legend. In
short, the FTC has made itself into virulent political and economic
pestilence, insulated from the people and their representatives, and
accountable to no influence except its own caprice.123
The Commission, Frenzel concluded, was “a rogue agency gone insane.”124
The accusation of Commission disobedience figured prominently in
Senate deliberations on the 1980 FTC Improvements Act. In less flamboyant
but still pointed terms, the chief Senate sponsors of the FTC Improvements
Act said restrictions were necessary to curb the agency’s unauthorized
adventurism. Senator Howard Cannon explained: “The real reason that we
have proposed this legislation for the FTC is because the Commission
appeared to be fully prepared to push its statutory authority to the very brink
and beyond. Good judgment and wisdom had been replaced with an
arrogance that seemed unparalleled among independent regulatory
agencies.”125
The accusation of disregard for congressional will soon echoed in
statements by high level officials in the newly arrived Reagan
administration. OMB Director Stockman recited a variant of this theme in
an appearance before a House of Representatives Committee early in 1981
to address his proposal to eliminate funding for the agency’s competition
mission. Stockman said, “ . . . in recent years the FTC has served the public
interest very poorly, in major part because it has sought to expand its power
and influence beyond that envisioned by Congress.”126
Beyond generalized claims of institutional disobedience, the accusation
of disregard for congressional will was invoked to justify proposals to
impose restrictions on specific FTC initiatives. For example, in the fall of
123. 125 CONG. REC. 466 (1979). To the same effect, see, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. E1536
(daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook)(calling the FTC a “renegade
agency”); 126 CONG. REC. H2196 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980) (statement of Rep. Quillen)
(describing the FTC as a “bureaucratic agency that is out to destroy free enterprise.”).
124. 125 CONG REC. 466 (1979) (statement of Rep. William Frenzel).
125. 126 CONG REC. 11, 917 (1980).
126. Impact of OMB-Proposed Budget Cuts For the Federal Trade Commission,
Hearing Before a H.R. Subcomm. On Gov’t Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 168 (1981)
(statement of David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget).
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1979, the Senate Commerce Committee held hearings on a proposal by
Senator Howell Heflin to eliminate the FTC’s power to order divestiture or
other forms of structural relief in non-merger cases.127 This was a shot across
the bow of the FTC’s pending “shared monopoly” 128 cases involving the
breakfast cereal and petroleum refining sectors, where the FTC had
requested structural relief (divestitures and, in the cereal case, compulsory
trademark licensing) to restore competition.129 Congress did not adopt the
Helfin proposal, but the idea of eliminating or restricting the FTC’s power
to seek divestiture remained a serious threat to the agency. Roughly a year
after the Commerce Committee hearings on the Heflin amendment, on the
day before the balloting in the 1980 presidential elections, Vice-President
Walter Mondale appeared at a campaign rally in Battle Creek, Michigan (the
headquarters of the Kellogg Company). The Vice-President assured his
audience that, if he and President Jimmy Carter were reelected, the Carter
administration would seek legislation to ban the FTC from obtaining
divestiture in the breakfast cereal shared monopolization case.130
A second, related claim was that the FTC had abandoned any adherence
to sound administrative practice and descended into utterly irrational
decision making. The agency was not merely disobedient (“rogue”) but

127. Federal Trade Commission – Divestiture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for
Consumers of the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transp., 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-5 (1979) [hereinafter FTC Divestiture Hearings].
128. The concept of shared monopoly and its application in DOJ and FTC cases are
examined in George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 Cornell L.
Rev. 439, 468–80 (1982).
129. See Kellogg Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 19,898
(No. 8883, Apr. 26, 1972) (alleging in the complaint shared monopolization and
maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure; requesting divestitures and compulsory
trademark licensing as remedies); Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶20,388 (No. 8934, July 17, 1973) (alleging in the complaint shared
monopolization and maintenance of a noncompetitive market structure and seeking
divestiture as remedy). See also FTC Divestiture Hearings, supra note 127, at 9–16
(statement by FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky)(describing how enactment of the Helfin
amendment would endanger FTC’s prospects of obtaining requested structural relief in
Kellogg and Exxon cases.).
130. Mondale told a political rally that “it is inconceivable to me and to many
independent experts that divestiture would be pursued. Neither President Carter nor I would
support such an action.” (emphasis removed). He added that, if reelected, he and President
Carter “certainly would” support legislation to ban the FTC from seeking a divestiture
remedy in the cereal case. Id. The Washington Post’s account of Mondale’s promise
reported that the Republican presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, also had castigated the
FTC for its prosecution of the case against Kellogg and the other leading producers of
breakfast cereals. Merrill Brown, Candidates Hit FTC Action, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1980,
at A7.
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crazy (“insane”), as well.131 Here, again, Congressman Frenzel pungently
made the point. The FTC, Frenzel said, “is a king-sized cancer on our
economy. It has undoubtedly added more unnecessary costs on American
consumers who it is charged with protecting, than any other half dozen
agencies combined.” 132 David Stockman’s initial broadside against the
Commission in February 1981 echoed this sentiment. In a newspaper
interview, Stockman said the FTC “is a passel of ideologues who are hostile
to the business system, to the free enterprise system, and who sit down there
and invent theories that justify more meddling and interference in the
economy.”133
The accusation of disobedience and the diagnosis of insanity fit poorly,
or at least awkwardly, with the positive record of the FTC’s activities in the
1970s. As discussed immediately below, the rogue agency story clashes with
the many instances, especially between 1969 and 1976, in which
congressional committees and key legislators directed the agency to carry
out an aggressive, innovative enforcement program against major
commercial interests. In 1969, numerous legislators endorsed the view of
two external studies that the FTC had used its authority timidly and
ineffectively.134 Leading members of Congress demanded that the agency

131. See 125 CONG REC. 466 (1979) (remarks of Rep. William Frenzel; calling the FTC
“a rogue agency gone insane”).
132. 125 CONG. REC. H10,757 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1979) (statement of Rep. William
Frenzel).
133. James Worsham & Bill Neikirk, FTC Not Needed, Budget Chief Says, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 23, 1981, at A1.
134. Two reports issued in 1969, one sponsored by Ralph Nader and the other prepared
by a committee convened by the American Bar Association, severely criticized the FTC’s
performance and recommended fundamental reforms. Edward F. Cox et al., “THE NADER
REPORT” ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); Am. Bar Ass’n, REPORT OF THE
ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); see also David A.
Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC’s
Critics, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1948, 1953-64 (2015) [hereinafter FTC’s Critics]
(reviewing findings of ABA and Nader studies); Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra
note 121, at 593-602 (same). Congress echoed the demands for reforms presented in the
Nader and ABA studies and threatened to abolish the Commission if sweeping
improvements were not forthcoming. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Procedures:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 110 (1969) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Jud. Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure:
“The subcommittee hopes . . . to see to it that the proposals we have received [from the
ABA Report] do not merely become grist for the mill of future students of the FTC. . . .
Surely, 45 years after [Gerard] Henderson’s landmark work on the FTC, first exposing
many of the same problems we see today, the time has come either to do something about
them, or . . . to consider abolishing the agency and starting it from the ground again.”).
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transform its competition and consumer programs or face extinction.135
Congress described the content of the desired transformation in several
ways. At a high level, oversight committees and individual legislators called
for a dramatic boost in the agency’s appetite to undertake ambitious, risky
projects¾to replace a cautious, risk-avoiding decision calculus with a bold
philosophy that erred in favor of intervention and used the agency’s elastic
powers innovatively. Congress’s admonition to be aggressive and use power
expansively emerged again and again in confirmation proceedings and
routine oversight hearings.136 During hearings in 1970 to confirm Caspar
Weinberger to be the Commission’s new chair, Senator Warren Magnuson,
Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, told the nominee to
“maintain the right kind of morale by recruiting strongly and expanding . . .
Trade Commission programs in order to perform the job well.”137 In setting
out this charge, Magnuson seemed to recognize that the FTC would have to
be steadfast in resisting backlash¾including from Congress¾that would
emerge as the FTC went about “expanding” its programs. The Commerce
Committee Chairman said Congress was calling on the FTC to perform
“tasks that require a great deal of attention and a great deal of fortitude not
to respond to any pressures that come from any place.”138
Weinberger’s successor, Miles W. Kirkpatrick, received similar, and
even more explicit congressional guidance, to apply the Commission’s
powers broadly and aggressively. In 1969, Kirkpatrick had chaired a blueribbon American Bar Association panel whose report recommended the FTC
implement an ambitious antitrust agenda that involved significant doctrinal,
operational, and political risks.139 In his appearances as FTC chair before
135. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 631–35. Kovacic, Congress
and the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 115, at 869–71.
136. Id.
137. Nomination of Caspar W. Weinberger to be Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 5 (1970)
(statement of Sen. Warren Magnuson, Chairman, Senate Commerce Committee).
138. Id. In his memoirs, Weinberger observed that he received similar guidance from
President Richard Nixon, who nominated him to serve as the Commission’s chairman.
Weinberger wrote: “There had been complaints that the FTC coddled big business and
neglected consumer complaints. President Nixon clearly wanted to change that. When I was
sworn in, the president said, ‘Business had better look out now!’” Nixon added that, on the
basis of what Weinberger had done as a senior advisor to California’s governor (Ronald
Reagan), “he’ll make life difficult for them.” CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, IN THE ARENA – A
MEMOIR OF THE 20TH CENTURY 179 (2001).
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (describing American Bar Association
Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission); see also Hyman & Kovacic, FTC’s
Critics, supra note 134, at 1969–70 (describing doctrinal, programmatic, and political risks
inherent in the ABA panel’s recommendations).
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congressional committees, Kirkpatrick often heard legislators applaud the
risk-preferring approach of the ABA study. In Kirkpatrick’s first appearance
before the Commission’s Senate Appropriations subcommittee in 1971, the
Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Gale McGee, provided the following
guidance:
I think this is one of the Federal commissions that has a much
larger responsibility and capability than sometimes it has been
willing to live up to for reasons of congressional sniping at it in
some respects or pressures put on it through the industry and the
like.
Too often it has been either shy or bashful. . . . That is why we
were having a rather closer look at your requests just in the hopes
of encouraging you, if anything, to make mistakes, but I think the
mistakes you are to make ought to be mistakes in doing and trying
rather than playing safe in not doing.
I believe that is the most serious mistake of all . . . you are not
faulted for making mistakes. You may be for making it twice in a
row, for not learning properly but, we would rather you make a
mistake innovating, trying something new, rather than playing so
cautiously that you never make a mistake. . . .140
In his appearance before the same subcommittee a year later, Senator
McGee observed with approval that Kirkpatrick had “responded to the
criticism . . . by both Mr. [Ralph] Nader and the American Bar Association
by moving aggressively against some of the major industries in the United
States.” 141 Recognizing that the approach he described could elicit
opposition from affected business interests, McGee promised that he and his
colleagues would exercise best efforts to watch the agency’s back: “[I]f you
step on toes you are going to catch flak for it, but I hope we will be able to
push this even more aggressively by backing you more completely with the
kind of help that I think you require.”142 McGee closed the proceedings with
140. Agric.—Env’t and Consumer Prot. Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2673 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Gale McGee, Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee). Senator
McGee closed out the hearing by telling Kirkpatrick: “We have considerable dependence on
your initiative . . . to stay on top of the great bulk of these bothersome areas that are easily
forfeited through neglect and we would like to encourage you to jump at rather than from.”
Id. at 2699.
141. Agriculture—Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1973: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d
Cong., 1483 (1972) (statement of Sen. Gale McGee, Chairman, Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee).
142. Id. at 1490.
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militant instructions:
“Stay with it and flex your muscles, clinch your fists, sharpen your
claws, and go to it. We think this is desperately important in the
interest of the Congress, whose creature you are, and the consumer
whose faith and substantive capabilities in surviving hang very
heavily upon what you succeed in doing.”143
Kirkpatrick served as the FTC’s chair for just over twenty-nine months.
The Commission’s new chair, Lewis Engman, received the same policy
guidance that Congress had provided Weinberger and Kirkpatrick. At
Engman’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee
early in 1973, Senator Frank Moss observed:
Under . . . Weinberger and Kirkpatrick, the Commission has taken
on new life beginning with the search for strong and imaginative,
rigorous developers and enforcers of the law and reaching out with
innovative programs to restore competition and to make consumer
sovereignty more than chamber of commerce rhetoric.144
With evident approval, Moss recounted how the FTC had “stretched
its powers to provide a credible countervailing public force to the enormous
economic and political power of huge corporate conglomerates which today
dominate American enterprise.”145 The members of the Senate Commerce
Committee, Moss concluded, “consider it one of our solemn duties to protect
the Commission from economic and political forces which would deflect it
from its regulatory zeal.” 146 Member after member of the Commerce
Committee echoed Moss’s message to Engman. Senator Ted Stevens, an
Alaska Republican, told the nominee, “I am really hopeful that . . . you will
become a real zealot in terms of consumer affairs and some of these big
business people will complain to us that you are going too far. That would
be the day, as far as I am concerned.”147
The FTC got the message. The words and actions of Weinberger,
Kirkpatrick, Engman, and other FTC leaders in this period reflected a
preference for boldness, aggressiveness, innovation, and zeal. In a letter to
Senator Edward Kennedy in July 1970, Weinberger reported that the FTC
was trying “to make the most of that other resource given to us by Congress
143. Id. at 1507.
144. Nomination of Lewis A. Engman, To Be a Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Com., 93d Cong., 4 (1973) (statement of Sen. Frank Moss,
Member, Senate Commerce Committee).
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 5.
147. Id. at 31.
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– our statutory powers.” 148 Weinberger said the Commission had
“encouraged the staff to make recommendations to us which will probe the
frontiers of our statutes,” had made progress in “[p]robling the outer limits”
and “exploring the frontiers” of the agency’s authority, and had shown it “is
receptive to novel and imaginative provisions in orders seeking to remedy
unlawful practices.”149 In a speech to a professional association in 1971,
Kirkpatrick reported that the Commission was “moving into ‘high gear’ in
the task of preserving and promoting competition in the American
economy.”150 He said he and his fellow board members “fully intend to be
in the vanguard of exploration of the new frontiers of antitrust law.”151
By mid-1974, the FTC had launched several significant cases involving
monopolization and collective dominance, including pathbreaking shared
monopolization cases against the breakfast cereal152 and petroleum refining
industries.153 With these matters underway, Engman in 1974 appeared at a
congressional hearing of the Joint Economic Committee and received
criticism that the FTC had been insufficiently active in challenging
monopolies.154 The Joint Committee’s chairman, Senator William Proxmire,
told Engman “the FTC, like a number of other regulatory agencies seems to
concern itself with minor infractions of the law, and to spend much of its
time on cases of small consequence.” 155 Perhaps astonished to hear that
cases to break up the nation’s leading breakfast cereal manufacturers and
petroleum refiners involved minor infractions or matters of small
consequence, Engman replied, “The Federal Trade Commission today is
very aggressive. . . . We have seen a total turnaround in terms of the types of
matters which are being addressed by the Bureau of Competition.”156
148. Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. and Proc. (July 20,
1970) (reprinted in Hearing on the Nomination of Miles W. Kirkpatrick to be Chairman of
the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the Senate Comm. on Com., 91st Cong., 133–34 (1970)).
149. Id. at 135.
150. William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 869, 876 (1988) (quoting Federal Trade Commission, ‘43 Grad Transforms Agency into
a ‘Growling Watchdog,’ U. PA. L. ALUMNI J., Fall 1971, at 9).
151. Id.
152. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting the shared monopolization
complaint against Kellogg and other leading producers of breakfast cereals).
153. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting the shared monopolization
complaint against Exxon and other leading petroleum refiners).
154. Market Power, the Federal Trade Commission, and Inflation: Hearing Before the
Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong. (1974). Engman’s prepared statement and testimony
appear at pages 31–78 of the published proceedings.
155. Id. at 59.
156. Id.
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Beyond general policy exhortations to exercise power boldly and to err
on the side of intervention, of doing too much rather than too little, Congress
in the early to mid-1970s instructed the Commission to focus attention on
specific commercial sectors and competitive problems within them. In the
face of severe fuel shortages and price spikes for petroleum products in the
early 1970s, numerous legislators demanded that the FTC conduct
investigations and challenge the conduct of large, integrated petroleum
companies.157 Many insisted that the FTC use its competition mandate to
force integrated refiners to deal on equitable terms with independent refiners
and distributors. 158 The Commission’s decision to file the Exxon shared
monopoly case, which sought extensive horizontal and vertical divestiture
remedies, can be explained as a response to these demands.159 In the same
period, Congress applied strong pressure upon the FTC to examine and
correct what it believed to be serious structural obstacles to effective
competition in the food manufacturing industry.160 Here, also, the agency’s
decision to prosecute the shared monopolization case against the country’s
leading producers of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals can be seen as a response
to this concern and faithful to the congressional prescription that the FTC
use novel, innovative approaches to cure competitive problems.161 In these
and other matters, the Commission explored the frontiers of its powers in the
development of new cases.162
When one aligns the guidance of Congress in the early to mid-1970s
about the appropriate content of FTC policy making with the FTC’s activity
in the decade, it is apparent that the critique of the agency as disobedient to
legislative will is a fiction, or at least badly misleading. A more accurate
positive depiction of events in the 1970s is that the Commission faithfully
followed legislative instructions given from 1970 up through the mid-1970s
about the appropriate philosophy and means of enforcement, and that, as the
decade came to a close, Congress changed its mind about what the FTC

157. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 637–39.
158. Id. at 638.
159. William E. Kovacic, Standard Oil Co. v. United States and Its Influence on the
Conception of Competition Policy, 11 COMPETITION L.J. 89, 97-98 (2012) (describing
congressional pressure in early 1970s to bring antitrust case against the leading integrated
petroleum companies); Timothy J. Muris & Bilal K. Sayyad, The Long Shadow of Standard
Oil: Policy, Petroleum, and Politics at the Federal Trade Commission, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev.
843, 859-63 (2012) (same).
160. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 636–37.
161. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing the initiation of the Kellogg
shared monopolization case).
162. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 643–49.
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should do and how it should do it. As described below in Section IV.D.,163
that change in legislative temperament and the response by Congress to
industry backlash against the FTC’s program have important implications
for how the FTC plans programs and selects projects in the future. Accurate
positive analysis reveals that the agency was not disobedient to Congress but
was inattentive to the operation of a political feedback loop that exposes
Congress to industry pressure once the FTC implements programs that
involve significant economic stakes and endanger powerful commercial
interests.164
Nor does a careful study of the positive record of the 1970s show that
the FTC policy making was “insane.” Measured by its contributions to
institution-building, the Commission did many things that epitomize good
public administration. It carried out important organizational and personnel
reforms that upgraded its operations and personnel.165 As explained more
fully below, the agency also improved its mechanisms for setting priorities
and selecting projects to achieve them and strengthened investments in
policy research and development (including a program to evaluate the effects
of completed cases).166 The FTC successfully carried out new regulatory
duties entrusted by Congress in the 1970s; most notable was the
implementation of the premerger notification mechanism that Congress
created in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.167 In
all of these areas, the Commission of the 1970s made enduring enhancements
to the institution and set important foundations for successful programs that
followed in the next forty years. An insane agency could not have done so.
163. Infra notes 296-301.
164. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1315–17, 1332; Kovacic, Congress
and the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 115, at 889–97.
165. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 643–51, 658–64.
166. See infra notes 201-231and accompanying text (describing organizational reforms
that improved FTC’s knowledge base); see also Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at
1306-07 (describing major Commission research projects in late 1970s); William E.
Kovacic, The Importance of History to the Design of Competition Policy Strategy: The
Federal trade Commission and Intellectual Property Law, 30 Seattle L. Rev. 319, 332–35
(2007) [hereinafter Importance of History] (describing historically-oriented research
programs originating at the FTC in the late 1970s); William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post
Evaluation to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L.
502, 524–27 (2006) (describing formation of FTC impact evaluation program in late 1970s).
167. 15 U.S.C.A. §18A (2012). On the FTC’s implementation of the premerger
notification regime, see William E. Kovacic, HSR at 35: The Early U.S. Premerger
Notification Experience and Its Meaning for New Systems of Competition Law, in NEW
COMPETITION INSTITUTIONS—SHAPING POLICIES AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS 9 (Richard
Whish & Christopher Townley eds., 2012); Malcolm R. Pfunder, Premerger Notification
After One Year: An FTC Staff Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1487 (1979).
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Another focal point for attention in assessing the FTC’s performance in
the 1970s was the quality of its substantive agenda. Was the FTC’s
substantive program in the 1970s “insane”? Many Commission competition
and consumer protection initiatives in the 1970s encountered grave
problems. FTC efforts to execute the bold, innovative, risk-preferring
program that Congress had called for earlier in the decade generated a
number of serious project failures. 168 Insanity, on the part of individual
leaders or the institution as a whole, does not explain the failures. These
outcomes have more prosaic causes whose understanding is important to the
future formulation of competition policy. Chief among the FTC’s flaws were
a lack of historical awareness about the political hazards associated with
undertaking an agenda of bold, innovative cases against powerful
commercial interests; inadequate appreciation for the demands of bringing
large numbers of difficult cases and promulgating ambitious trade regulation
rules would impose on the agency’s improving but uneven human capital;
and underestimation of the change in the center of gravity of economic
learning that supports the operation of the U.S. antitrust system. As
described below, many of these failings are rooted in weaknesses in the
FTC’s knowledge in the 1970s of the positive record of its past enforcement
experience.169
B. The Inadequate and Misdirected Enforcement Activity Narrative
Like the hyperactivity narrative described above, the inadequate
activity narrative relies heavily on enforcement data to support the view that
the federal antitrust agencies have brought too few cases overall and, when
filing cases, have focused resources on the wrong types of matters.
Implicit or explicit assumptions about the level of enforcement activity
have provided a central foundation in the modern era for broad normative
claims of poor system performance. One collection of inadequacy critiques
attacks federal enforcement program of the Reagan administration – a period
characterized by what one journalist described as an “almost total
abandonment of antitrust policy.” 170 In 1987, in discussing Reagan-era
168. These failures are recounted in Kovacic, Modern Evolution. supra note 25, at 449–
52; Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 21, at 309–11; William E. Kovacic &
Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 942-43 (2010) (describing how the FTC can
develop cases premised on Section 5 principles instead of the Sherman Act).
169. See infra Section III (discussing how weak historical awareness helped undermine
FTC programs initiated in the 1970s)
170. Joanna Ramey, Clinton Seen Putting Muscle in Antitrust, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY,

2020]

KEEPING SCORE

87

federal antitrust enforcement, Professor Robert Pitofsky said the DOJ and
the FTC had produced “the most lenient antitrust enforcement program in
fifty years.”171 Professor Milton Handler remarked that in the Reagan era “a
policy of nonenforcement has set in, much to the distress of those who
believe that without antitrust the free market cannot remain free.” 172
Professors Lawrence Sullivan and Wolfgang Fikentscher observed, in
addressing the treatment of civil nonmerger matters, “enforcement
ceased.”173
A second body of commentary assails the work of the federal agencies
in the George W. Bush administration. For example, in 2008, during his
campaign to gain the Democratic Party’s nomination for the presidency,
Barack Obama said the George W. Bush administration “has what may be
the weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last
half-century.” 174 The Obama statement did not compare activity levels
across all administrations over the 50-year-long comparison period, but the
statement suggested that the general claim was based on variations in activity
over time.
A third version of the inadequacy narrative marks the beginning of the
decline of effective enforcement at the outset of the George W. Bush
administration and extending through the present.175
A fourth variant writes off the entire period from roughly 1980 onward
as an antitrust catastrophe.176 After noting that for most of the 20th century
“antitrust enforcement waxed or waned depending on the administration in
office,” Professor Robert Reich recently wrote that “after 1980 it all but

Feb. 26, 1993, at S42.
171. Robert Pitofsky, Does Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 GEO. L.J. 321, 321 (1987).
172. Milton Handler, Forward, 75 CAL. L. REV. 787, 788 (1987); see Milton Handler, Is
Antitrust’s Centennial a Time for Obsequies or Renewed Faith in Its National Policy?, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 1933, 1935 (1989) (calling Reagan administration’s federal antitrust
program “vigorous and effective non-enforcement”).
173. Lawrence A. Sullivan & Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the Antitrust
Idea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 197, 206 (1998). See also HARTMANN, HIDDEN HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 3 (“Monopoly . . . is why working people’s pay has not gone up since
1982, when President Ronald Reagan’s Federal Trade Commission and Department of
Justice stopped enforcing the anti-monopoly laws.”).
174. Obama, AAI Statement, supra note 14.
175. APPLEBAUM, ECONOMISTS’ HOUR, supra note 13, at 157.
176. See, e.g., HARTMANN, HIDDEN HISTORY, supra note 13, at 126 (“What has changed
so much in America in the past 40 years? Simple. Reagan and the Supreme Court put Robert
Bork’s theories into effect, and our formerly diverse and competitive corporate landscape
has been wiped out, replaced by a few hundred giant corporations that control nearly every
aspect of our economy – and our politics.”); STOLLER, GOLIATH, supra note 8, at 407–39.
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disappeared.”177 He added that Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama
“allowed antitrust enforcement to ossify, enabling large corporations to grow
far larger and major industries to become more concentrated.”178
Presented below are categories of arguments that rely upon specific
assertions about the positive record of modern antitrust enforcement. These
arguments make positive claims regarding either the amount of activity, the
reasons for observed behavior, or both.
GENERAL CRITICISMS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: BORK, REAGAN, AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF U.S. COMPETITION POLICY
Many commentators have offered explanations for why federal antitrust
enforcement became inadequate after the late 1970s. One major positive
explanation is that the modern Chicago School of antitrust analysis,
grounded largely in the writings of Robert Bork, inspired a severe
retrenchment of enforcement at the DOJ and the FTC and led the federal
courts to narrow antitrust doctrine since the late 1970s.179 A major focus of
this discussion of the causes for changes in enforcement involves rules
governing the treatment of dominant firms.180
A second cause offered to explain a redirection of enforcement is the
ascent to the presidency of Ronald Reagan and his appointment of
permissive leadership to the DOJ and the FTC.181 The Reagan administration
177. ROBERT B. REICH, THE SYSTEM – WHO RIGGED IT, HOW WE FIX IT 115 (2020). See
also TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP, supra note 8, at 210 (“Then came Ronald Reagan, and the
beginning of four decades of a new antitrust vision and weak enforcement.”).
178. Reich, supra note 177, at 162. Compare APPLEBAUM, ECONOMISTS’ HOUR, supra
note 13, at 156 (“The merger wave of the Clinton years was surpassed by the merger wave
of the Bush years, which was surpassed by the merger wave of the Obama years.”);
TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP, supra note 8, at 211–12 (“Clinton, Bush, and Obama all
presided over an ongoing merger wave that would have horrified any 1960s judge.”).
179. William E. Kovacic, The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust
History, 87 CHI. L. REV. 459 (2020) [hereinafter Chicago Obsession]; see also HARTMANN,
HIDDEN HISTORY, supra note 13, at 81 {“In 40 short years, America has devolved from
being a relatively open market economy and a functioning democracy into a largely
monopolistic economy and a monopolist-friendly political system. One of the principal
architects of that transformation was Robert Bork.”); DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED, supra note 11,
at 6 (noting that Bork published his ANTITRUST PARADOX “at the right moment, when
Democrats were abandoning the New Deal and Republicans were coalescing around
corporate conservatism. Within a couple of years of publication, Ronald Reagan would win
election and put Bork’s theories into practice. And the rest is history.”).
180. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2007) [hereinafter Double Helix].
181. HARTMANN, HIDDEN HISTORY, supra note 13, at 3; TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP,
supra note 8, at 210–12; APPLEBAUM, ECONOMISTS’ HOUR, supra note 13, at 152–53;

2020]

KEEPING SCORE

89

is said to have inherited a generally well-functioning antitrust enforcement
system and run it into the ground.
The Chicago School, Bork-centric, and Reagan-centric explanations for
policy change can be misleading due to mischaracterizations of what took
place and their tendency to omit other forces that had helped narrow the
scope of antitrust enforcement. Bork and the Chicago School unmistakably
have exerted a significant impact upon modern antitrust policy, but the
retrenchment of antitrust enforcement in some areas cannot accurately be
attributed to them entirely or, for a number of important developments, even
principally.182 Many proponents of the inadequacy narrative make little or
no mention of the role of modern Harvard School scholars, such as Philip
Areeda and Donald Turner, in leading courts and enforcement agencies to
move the antitrust system toward a less interventionist stance.183
Areeda and Turner encouraged courts to forego reliance on noneconomic goals in deciding antitrust cases.184 The two Harvard scholars also
advocated the adoption of stricter procedural and doctrinal screens to
counteract what they perceived to be flaws in the U.S. system of private
rights of action.185 The inadequacy narrative often overlooks the influence
of the modern Harvard School and thus misses how much the permissiveness
of modern antitrust policy reflects the Harvard School’s concern that private
rights of action over-deter legitimate business conduct by dominant firms.186
Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 384–89.
182. Kovacic, Chicago Obsession, supra note 179, at 474; Kovacic, Double Helix, supra
note 180 at 35.
183. Id.
184. Kovacic, Chicago Obsession, supra note 179, at 473–74.
185. Kovacic, Double Helix, supra note 180, at 41–71.
186. Binyamin Applebaum’s account of the inadequacy of modern federal antitrust
enforcement and the undue retrenchment of economic regulation generally discusses the
role of Stephen Breyer as an academic, a member of a Senate committee staff, and as a
federal judge. APPLEBAUM, ECONOMISTS’ HOUR, supra note 13, at 150, 168–69, 171.
Applebaum does not mention Justice Breyer’s Harvard Law School colleague, Philip
Areeda, who informed Justice Breyer’s antitrust thinking. In one passage, Applebaum
describes Justice Breyer, in an article he authored as a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, as striving to incorporate Robert Bork’s insights into the resolution of
antitrust disputes: “Judges wanted to believe Bork, too. They were struggling to deal with
increasingly complex antitrust cases, and the “Chicago School” approach of [Aaron]
Director and his disciples offered a clear and consistent standard, even for more liberal
jurists. Stephen Breyer, the future Supreme Court justice, wrote in 1983, while serving on
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, that economics “offers objectivity – terra firma – upon
which we can base decisions.” Id. at 150. The policy prescription in Justice Breyer’s
comment likely was inspired by the teaching of Areeda and not Chicago School academics.
Kovacic, Double Helix, supra note 180, at 41–51. To read Applebaum’s account of
Breyer’s work, one would not know that Areeda existed or influenced Breyer substantially.

90

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

This yields a faulty positive diagnosis of the forces that have reduced the
reach of the U.S. antitrust regime. As noted below, understanding how the
institution-grounded limitations proposed by the modern Harvard School
have imposed greater demands on plaintiffs has important implications for
government plaintiffs seeking to devise a strategy to reclaim doctrinal
ground lost since the 1970s.187
Similar imprecision and omission characterize the portrayal of the
Reagan administration as the force that swung antitrust policy away from a
sensible interventionist equilibrium and gave it a durably noninterventionist
orientation. Some elements of the Reagan-centric narrative turn events 180
degrees around from their positive roots.188 More significant, the narrative
does not address how badly the Congress and the White House had damaged
the FTC’s stature and operations before Ronald Reagan took office in late
January 1981. By the end of 1980, the Commission had been shoved into
the equivalent of political bankruptcy by a Congress and a White House
under the control of the Democratic Party.189
By treating the 1980 presidential election as the cause of an abrupt
change in federal antitrust enforcement policy, the Reagan-centric
inadequacy narrative fails to grasp the significance of the political assault,
led by Democrats, against the FTC in the late 1970s. Recognition of how
the FTC’s relationship with Congress changed over the course of the 1970s
forces one to confront the question of why an agency that enjoyed powerful
congressional support through much of the decade came to grief so quickly.
The episode has a sobering cautionary lesson for contemporary policy
making: it demonstrates how quickly congressional attitudes can change
once powerful business interests affected by FTC actions bring their
See also TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP, supra note 8, at 173–74 (discussing retrenchment of
doctrine controlling predatory pricing; making no mention of Areeda and Turner).
187. See infra Section II.C. (describing how understanding the modern Harvard School’s
distinctive influence on antitrust jurisprudence can help plaintiffs construct successful
litigation arguments).
188. For example, Binyamin Applebaum’s account of James Miller’s chairmanship of
the FTC observes that Miller “didn’t go after doctors.” APPLEBAUM, ECONOMISTS’ HOUR,
supra note 13, at 153. As FTC chair, Miller actively opposed congressional efforts in the
early 1980s to withdraw the FTC’s jurisdiction over the learned professions. JAMES C.
MILLER III, THE ECONOMIST AS REFORMER: REVAMPING THE FTC, 1981–1985 (1989). Miller
joined the FTC’s unanimous opinion (authored by Michael Pertschuk) finding liability in the
agency’s horizontal restraints case against the Indiana Federation of Dentists, Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57 (1983), and he supported the Commission in its
successful appeal of an adverse court of appeals decision to the Supreme Court. Indiana
Federation of Dentists v. FTC, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
189. Supra notes 107-130 and accompanying text; Kovacic, Congress and the Federal
Trade Commission, supra note 115, at 870–71.
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resources to bear upon Congress, and how turnover in the legislature can
erode vital political support. An accurate positive account of the 1970s
suggests that an agency should strive to complete its cases and rulemaking
initiatives as expeditiously as possible, lest long lags between the start and
conclusion of matters expose the agency to debilitating political backlash.
This policy making prescription becomes apparent only by forming an
accurate picture of what happened to the FTC in the 1970s.
CHICAGO-SCHOOL INSPIRED FOCUS ON PRICE EFFECTS
Critics of modern FTC and DOJ law enforcement often state that the
federal agencies focus entirely on price and output effects in selecting and
prosecuting cases. This tunnel-visioned approach is said to ignore important
considerations involving the harmful effects of business behavior on quality
and innovation.
In 2019, in a newspaper op-ed, Rana Fordoohar, a journalist who covers
the tech sector, stated: “But monopoly policy in America is currently driven
by “Chicago School” thinking, which espouses the idea that as long as
consumers aren’t paying too much for a good or service, all is well.”190 In
August 2020, Joshua Brustein, a business journalist, said: “For decades,
antitrust enforcers have centered on the consumer welfare standard, which
defined price increases as the only valid focus of antitrust action.”191
Like the portrayal of activity levels, these positive descriptions of
the policy concerns that have guided FTC and DOJ law enforcement are
faulty. The claim that the federal antitrust agencies since the late 1970s have
focused solely upon price and output effects overlooks the many important
instances in which innovation and other quality-related effects were
paramount in FTC and DOJ decisions to challenge mergers and bring
nonmerger cases.192 Among other areas from the 1980s to the present, the
DOJ and the FTC have emphasized innovation effects in analyzing
competitive effects in deals involving defense contractors193 and transactions
190. Rana Fordoohar, America’s New Antitrust Agenda, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019)
https://www.ft.com/content/c27a517a-2631-11e9-8ce6-5db4543da632 [https://perma.cc/JL4
D-NUBF].
191. Joshua Brustein, Democrats are the Hipsters of Antitrust, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19,
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-08-19/the-hipsters-of-antitrust
[https://perma.cc/4UJF-35AZ].
192. The importance of innovation concerns in DOJ and FTC law enforcement is
analyzed in RICHARD J. GILBERT, INNOVATION MATTERS – COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE
HIGH TECHNOLOGY ECONOMY 139–218 (2020).
193. See, e.g., Joint Statement of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission on Preserving Competition in the Defense Industry (Apr. 12, 2016) (“In the
defense industry, the Agencies are especially focused on ensuring that defense mergers will
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in the health care sector.194
INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST DOMINANT FIRM MISCONDUCT
A recurring critique of modern U.S. federal enforcement is the failure
of the DOJ and the FTC to police dominant firm misconduct. In 2002,
Professor Robert Pitofsky wrote that “during the Reagan years, there was no
enforcement whatsoever” against attempts to monopolize and
monopolization.195 At a conference in 2009, Professor Harvey Goldschmid
observed that during the George W. Bush presidency “there has been no
enforcement” of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.196
In a wide-ranging attack upon federal antitrust enforcement since the
1970s, Jonathan Tepper and Denise Hearn concluded:
The evidence confirms the death of antitrust. When surveying
merger challenges, [Professor Gustavo] Grullon found that
enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act fell from an average
of 15.7 cases per year from 1970-1999 to less than 3 over the
period 2000-2014. . . . The recent failure to enforce antitrust is
horrifying, considering how industries have become more
concentrated every year.197
In May 2018, Senator Richard Blumenthal and Professor Tim Wu
not adversely affect short- and long-term innovation crucial to our national security. . . .”);
Daniel L. Rubinfeld & John Haven, Innovation and Antitrust Enforcement, in DYNAMIC
COMPETITION AND PUBLIC POLICY 65 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001) (discussing DOJ emphasis on
innovation-related effects in antitrust enforcement, including the Department’s challenge to
Lockheed Martin’s effort to purchase Northrop Grumman in the late 1990s); William E.
Kovacic, Competition Policy Retrospective: The Formation of the United Launch Alliance
and the Ascent of SpaceX, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 867–68, 899–900 (2020)
[hereinafter Competition Policy Retrospective] (discussing centrality of innovation issues in
modern antitrust analysis of aerospace and defense mergers).
194. See FTC, Press Release, FTC Seeks to Block Cytyc Corp.’s Acquisition of Digene
Corp. (June 24, 2002) (announcing FTC decision to seek injunction to bar merger of two
firms in the market for cervical cancer screening products), available at https://www.ftc.gov
/news-events/press-releases/2002/06/ftc-seeks-block-cytyc-corps-acquisition-digene-corp [h
ttps://perma.cc/U3D6-TMPE]. The FTC press release quotes Joseph Simons, Director of
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, as saying: “The merger as proposed raises serious
competitive concerns within the highly concentrated market for this important diagnostic
tool. As a result of the proposed acquisition, it is likely that prices would increase, product
innovation would suffer, and ultimately, patient care would be compromised.” Id.
195. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A View from the
Middle, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 583, 587 (2002) [hereinafter A View from the Middle].
196. ABA Antitrust Chair’s Showcase Probes Effects of Faltering Economy on
Enforcement, 96 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 2395 (Apr. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter Chair’s Showcase] (quoting Professor Harvey Goldschmid).
197. TEPPER & HEARN, MYTH OF CAPITALISM, supra note 9, at 161.
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authored an op-ed piece that recited similar statistics: “Enforcement of the
antimonopoly laws has fallen: Between 1970 and 1999, the United States
brought about 15 monopoly cases each year; between 2000 and 2014, that
number went down to just three.”198
Each of these statements about the amount of federal enforcement
activity is incorrect. The Reagan antitrust agencies did not bring many
cases 199 involving attempted monopolization or monopolization, but the
number exceeded what Professor Pitofsky called “no enforcement
whatsoever”. 200 The number of FTC attempted monopolization and
monopolization cases initiated from 2001 through 2008 exceeded what
Professor Goldschmid called “no enforcement.”201 From 1970 through 1999,
federal enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the enforcement of
Section 5 of the FTC Act to challenge collective dominance or single-firm
exclusionary conduct did not exceed four cases per year – a notably lower
rate of activity than the number of cases per year reported by Senator
Blumenthal and Professor Wu (“about 15 cases each year”) and the number
for the same period reported by Jonathan Tepper and Denise Hearn (15.7
cases per year).202
198. Richard Blumenthal & Tim Wu, What the Microsoft Antitrust Case Taught Us, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter Microsoft Antitrust Case],
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/opinion/microsoft-antitrust-case.html
[https://perma.cc/U9J8-W3S3].
199. This paper uses “many” in a relative sense. The number of relevant cases during
the eight years of the Reagan presidency (a total of four cases) was notably smaller than the
number of such cases prosecuted by the federal agencies in the period from 1969 through
1980 (a total of 32 cases). Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 449, 460.
200. Pitofsky, A View from the Middle, supra note 195, at 587. The DOJ and the FTC
each brought two cases involving attempted monopolization or monopolization during the
Reagan presidency. Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 449. The most notable
matter was the DOJ’s successful prosecution of American Airlines for attempted
monopolization after American’s CEO (Robert Crandall) invited his counterpart at Braniff
(Howard Putnam) to collude in reducing capacity and raising prices on city pairs in and out
of the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743
F.2d. 1114 (5th Cir. 1984).
201. Chair’s Showcase, supra note 196 (quoting Professor Harvey Goldschmid) The
FTC’s attempted monopolization and monopolization cases (a total of seven matters)
initiated during the George W. Bush presidency are described in Kovacic, Rating the
Competition Agencies, supra note 1, at 911, 913. These cases included the FTC’s
unsuccessful prosecution of Rambus for illegal monopolization. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522
F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir 2008).
202. Blumenthal & Wu, Microsoft Antitrust Case, supra note 198; TEPPER & HEARN,
MYTH OF CAPITALISM, supra note 9, at 166. I am unable to replicate the data presented in
the Blumenthal/Wu op ed article and the Tepper/Hearn book. In Myth of Capitalism, the
authors cite Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries
Becoming More Concentrated? (Aug. 31, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612047 [https://
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INADEQUATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Inadequacy narratives frequently use categorical statements about
activity levels to demonstrate weaknesses in federal merger enforcement. In
a discussion of Reagan administration antitrust policy, Professor Eleanor
Fox observed that “U.S. federal merger enforcement ground to a halt.”203
In the 2010 edition of their antitrust casebook, Professor Robert Pitofsky,
Professor Harvey Goldschmid, and Judge Diane Wood observed that there
was “no enforcement at all against vertical or conglomerate mergers during
the Bush Administration.” 204 In a recent book discussing U.S. antitrust
policy, Professor Tim Wu observed that the DOJ in the George W. Bush
administration “did not block any major mergers.”205
The factual claims contained in these assessments are incorrect.
Federal merger enforcement during the Reagan administration did not grind
to a halt.206 The George W. Bush Administration did not challenge large
numbers of vertical mergers, but the number was greater than the “no
enforcement at all” amount claimed by Professor Pitofsky, Professor

perma.cc/M3DQ-LQK9] for the proposition that the DOJ and the FTC collectively brought
15.7 Sherman Act Section 2 cases per year from 1970 through 1999. The paper
subsequently was published as Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S.
Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 2019 REVIEW OF FINANCE 697. In both the 2018
version of the SSRN paper and the REVIEW OF FINANCE version, Professor Grullon and his
coauthors say “we find in untabulated results that the number of cases filed by the
Department of Justice under Section 2 of the Sherman Act has weakened since early 2000.”
Id. at 734. Neither paper provides statistics to support this observation, nor do the authors
appear to include FTC Section 2 activity across these periods. It is unclear whether the
2017 version of the Grullon paper posted on SSRN provided the back-up data, or whether
Professor Grullon gave a spoken presentation in which he presented data on slides. In the
early 2000s, I studied DOJ and FTC enforcement activity involving single-firm conduct and
“shared monopoly” cases. My count of total DOJ and FTC attempted monopolization,
single-firm monopolization, and shared monopolization cases yielded the following results:
27 cases from 1969 through 1976 (3.375 cases per year); 5 cases from 1977 through 1980
(1.25 cases per year); 4 cases from 1981 through 1988 (0.5 cases per year); 0 cases from
1989 through 1992 (0 cases per year); and 11 cases from 1993 through 2000 (1.375 cases
per year). Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 448–49.
203. Eleanor M. Fox, Can We Control Merger Control? – An Experiment, in Policy
Directions for Global Merger Review 79, 84 (Global Competition Review: Special Report
for the Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy 1999).
204. ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1075 (6th ed. 2010).
205. WU, CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 8, at 108–09.
206. See, e.g., Ronald W. Davis, Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint
Ventures: A Pragmatic Guide to Evaluation of Legal Risks, 11 DEL. CORP. L.J. 25, 25–27
(1986) (reviewing and presenting data on federal merger enforcement activity from 1981
through 1984).
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Goldschmid, and Judge Wood.207 During the Bush administration, the DOJ
sued and blocked mergers involving General Dynamics/Newport News
Shipbuilding (nuclear submarine design and production) 208 and United
Airlines/US Airways (airline transportation services). 209 Given the
significance of the merging parties and the importance of the economic
sectors at issue, competition law experts, in responding to Professor Wu,
likely would score these proposed transactions as “major” mergers.
C. How Narratives Predicated Upon Mistaken Positive Assumptions
Distort Understanding About the Functioning of the U.S. Antitrust
Regime
Should the competition policy community of academics, advocacy
groups, government officials, and practitioners care about these and other
inaccurate depictions of federal enforcement activity? Indeed, they should.
There is a danger that the fractured positive accounts of past activity will be
taken as true and inform the debate about the future of competition policy.
There is a fast-expanding literature that contends, as Professor Daniel Crane
puts it, that “antitrust enforcement has drifted toward near-oblivion, with
potentially dire consequences for our economy, and society more
generally.” 210 The portrayal of inert federal agencies as abandoning a
sensible earlier custom of robust enforcement is a particularly important
pillar of modern calls for sweeping reform.211
Failure to Learn from Earlier Enforcement Activities. A major hazard
of the inadequacy narratives and their dismal depiction of modern antitrust
policy is that they impede the learning by which an antitrust agency improves
over time. If it is assumed as a fact that the federal antitrust enforcement

207. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR CONSUMERS: THE FTC
YEAR IN REVIEW 8 (2003) (describing FTC challenge to proposed merger of Cytyc and
Digene and decision of companies to abandon the transaction); United States v. Premdor,
Inc., 2002 WL 1816981 (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2002) (alleging in complaint that, inter alia, adverse
competitive effect from vertical features of Premdor’s acquisition of Masonite).
208. U.S. v. General Dynamics Corp. & Newport News Shipbuilding Inc., Civ. No.
1:01CV02200 (Filed Oct. 23, 2001), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document
/verified-complaint-3 [https://perma.cc/W58P-VRPU].
209. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Enforcement at the Antitrust Division 2-3 (Sept. 27,
2002) (KMPG/Chicago Graduate School of Business Mergers and Acquisitions Forum),
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/merger-enforcement-antitrust-division-0 [htt
ps://perma.cc/5VTP-XMQY].
210. Crane, Antitrust Law and Its Critics, supra note 2, at 253.
211. See, e.g., Blumenthal & Wu, Microsoft Antitrust Case, supra note 198.
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policy was devoid of useful activity for the past forty years or longer, then
there is no point in looking for positive accomplishments. A listener who
accepts as true the claim that nothing happened, or that what happened was
the work of an insane agency, reasonably might conclude that there is
nothing worth emulating from the earlier period.
There is a serious cost to embracing the excessive activity narrative or
the inadequate activity narrative as resting on sound positive foundations.
By writing off the relevant eras as a wasteland, one ignores noteworthy
policy developments that modern analysts can use to guide policy going
forward. Merger enforcement provides an example. If federal merger
enforcement actually ground to a halt between 1981 and 1988, there would
be no merger challenges to study. Yet the federal enforcers blocked a
number of deals in this period 212 and, in some instances, the government
gained favorable judicial decisions that provide clues about how to formulate
successful challenges in the future.213
Perhaps the most notable of the government’s merger litigation
victories in the 1980s was the FTC’s successful challenge to Hospital Corp.’s
effort to acquire Hospital Affiliates International, Inc. and Health Care
Corp. 214 The Commission argued that the acquisitions would reduce
competition by enabling the surviving firms to coordinate behavior more
effectively with regard to pricing and other terms of service.215 The 117page opinion for the Commission by Commissioner Terry Calvani is a
textbook model of superb opinion-writing, what the Seventh Circuit called a
“model of lucidity.” 216 Commissioner Calvani carefully set out the
arguments of complaint counsel and the defendants, reviewed the precedent
and literature regarding the coordinated effects theory of harm, and displayed
212. Two notable merger enforcement actions involved the petroleum sector. In
December 1981, the FTC voted to authorize the agency’s staff to file a complaint in federal
district court to seek an injunction barring Mobil Corporation from purchasing Marathon Oil
Company. Robert Cole, F.T.C. Fights Mobil Bid on Marathon, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1981),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/09/business/ftc-fights-mobil-bid-on-maratho
n.html [https://perma.cc/2WU7-B6W9]. In a separate action in the same month, Marathon
obtained an injunction against the merger. Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378
(6th Cir. 1982). In 1982, the Commission authorized its staff to seek an injunction to prevent
Gulf Oil Company from buying Cities Service Company. The parties abandoned the
transaction. Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 444.
213. Successfully litigated government challenges to mergers in this period include FTC
v. PPG Indus., 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d
1381 (7th Cir. 1986); FTC v. Warner Communs., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
214. Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986).
215. Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 455 (1985) (Opinion by the Commission,
Calvani, Commissioner).
216. Hospital Corp., 807 at 1385.
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the type of erudition and expertise that is offered as a justification for
entrusting antitrust adjudication to an expert administrative body.217
Every commissioner who is assigned to write an opinion for the FTC
should feel an obligation to read the Calvani Hospital Corp. decision to see
the quality of analysis and style of presentation that can impress a court of
appeals favorably. Rather than dismiss the period since 1980 as a barren era
in federal enforcement, the advocates for a major expansion of intervention
should assemble an accurate positive record of every decision and every
initiative that can help them achieve their ends.
In the face of a demanding judiciary, the FTC will need every advantage
it can obtain, including footholds provided by enforcement measures
undertaken from the early 1980s forward. If proponents of fundamental
change treat the past forty years as an empty space in antitrust policy, they
will walk past precedents and practices that would advance their cause. If
one assumes that timidity bordering on cowardice gripped the federal
agencies after 1999, there is likewise no point in considering how the FTC
in the 2010s achieved considerable success in three consecutive trips to the
Supreme Court in antitrust cases218 – the first time the Commission had won
three straight cases before the high court since the 1960s – or bothering to
understand what mix of strategy and advocacy (and, perhaps, luck) made it
possible.
The analysis of innovation issues provides another example of how an
accurate grasp of the positive record can help build a new program. Consider
the claim, noted above, that the federal agencies brought no vertical merger
cases between 2001 and 2008.219 An observer who embraced this view is
likely to overlook the FTC’s decision to block the proposed merger of Cytyc
and Digene.220 The Commission’s analysis of this transaction teaches a lot
about how to analyze innovation markets that reach back to the earliest stages
of an R&D pipeline.
Adherence to the view that modern antitrust policy has ignored
217. In its 105-year history, the FTC has not always fulfilled its intended adjudication
role as the expositor of widely emulated interpretations of the antitrust statutes. Daniel A.
Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1835, 1856-69 (2015). In
Hospital Corp., it did so with distinction.
218. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Hospital Sys.,
Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’r’s. v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015).
219. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (quoting Professor Robert Pitofsky,
Professor Harvey Goldschmid, and Judge Diane Wood).
220. See FTC, Press Release, FTC Seeks to Block Cytyc Corp.’s Acquisition of Digene
Corp. (June 24, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/06/ftc-seeksblock-cytyc-corps-acquisition-digene-corp [https://perma.cc/U3D6-TMPE] (describing FTC
decision to block merger of Cytyc and Digene).
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innovation effects in merger analysis and in nonmerger cases likewise will
miss important sources of insight. The experience of the two federal
agencies since the early 1980s in reviewing aerospace and defense industry
mergers illuminates how to analyze innovation issues and formulate
successful merger challenges in dynamic, high technology sectors.221 The
federal government’s analysis of these transactions has been representative
of a larger awareness that innovation concerns should be decisive, or at least
equal in importance to price effects, in a significant number of merger
reviews and nonmerger matters.222
Diagnosing the Obstacles to Litigation Success and Overcoming Them.
A second and closely related reason to resist faulty positive accounts of past
experience is that they obscure the path to possible litigation success in
single-firm monopolization cases. In the FTC’s unsuccessful Rambus
case,223 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied heavily
on a Supreme Court decision (NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.224 ) that was
premised in part on concerns about overdeterrence that might arise from
private treble-damage law suits.225 The FTC might have argued to the D.C.
Circuit that the Commission, as a federal government agency, was a
responsible steward of the public trust and need not be bound by doctrines
designed to confine private litigants. Future attempts to use litigation to
condemn dominant firm conduct, and extend the reach of antitrust oversight,
might emphasize the distinctive role of public enforcement and, perhaps,
resort more extensively to the FTC’s administrative adjudication process.
In other words, seeing more clearly the foundations of defendantfriendly doctrine indicates what litigation strategy (i.e., premised on the
distinctive role of the public prosecutor and the special capacity of the FTC’s
administrative process) promises the greatest prospects for success in what
is today a daunting judicial environment. To use litigation to expand the
zone of potential intervention, the Commission will need to study and build

221. Kovacic, Competition Policy Retrospective, supra note 193, at 899–900.
222. RICHARD J. GILBERT, INNOVATION MATTERS – COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE HIGHTECHNOLOGY ECONOMY 139–66 (2020); Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging
Innovation into Antitrust Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1919 (2005).
223. Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
224. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
225. The Supreme Court’s discussion of overdeterrence concerns in Discon appears at
525 U.S. at 137. The D.C. Circuit’s application of Discon to the Commission’s theory of
harm in Rambus appears at 522 F.3d at 464. See also Richard Dagen, Rambus, Innovation
Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1479, 1488–93 (2010) (analyzing
the D.C. Circuit/s application of Discon in Rambus).
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upon litigation successes such as McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 226 where the
Commission prevailed on a monopolization theory of liability before a court
of appeals that has not always been a favorable forum for the review of
Commission antitrust cases. 227 If one assumes, as some commentators
suggest, that the federal agencies brought no monopolization cases in the
past twenty years, then one is unlikely to look for or study McWane – to
recognize the doctrinal footholds it provides for future cases, to analyze how
the agency assembled a convincing factual record, and, more generally, to
see how the agency can replicate the success in the future.
Setting a Common Foundation for Debate About Future Antitrust
Enforcement. A third reason to remedy the uncertain grasp of the past is its
importance to the modern debates about the proper direction for the U.S.
antitrust system. Without a common understanding of what actually
happened in the past, how can policy makers and commentators make sound
normative judgments about what the U.S. enforcement agencies should do
in the future? Professor Douglas Melamed recently has posited that the
contestants in the modern debate about antitrust policy often talk past each
other and do not engage on questions crucial to deciding whether and how
much to modify current antitrust policy, or to create new competition policy
instruments and institutions.228 It is doubtful that what Professor Melamed
calls two largely disconnected “conversations”229 can be joined up without a
better common understanding of what actually has taken place. In so many
ways, accurate comprehension of what happened is the essential foundation
for the processes of interpretation (What explains the behavior in question?
What is its significance?), evaluation (Was the behavior good or bad?), and
refinement (What should we do next time?).
Think of it in terms of teaching a class. Suppose the bases for the grade
in the course are (a) regular attendance in class, (b) contributions to class
discussion, and (c) performance on an end-of-term examination. Before we
determine the quality of the student’s work and assign a grade, we need first
to agree about whether the student showed up for class, spoke in class, and
turned in an exam. Modern discourse about U.S. competition law indicates
a lack of agreement on equivalents of these basic predicates for a normative
assessment of the performance of the antitrust enforcement system.
Appreciating How Institutional Arrangements Shape Substantive
226. McWane, Inc. v. F.T.C., 783 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2015).
227. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2005) (denying
enforcement of F.T.C. administrative decision finding liability in reverse payment case).
228. Melamed, supra note 2.
229. Id. at 286–92.
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Outcomes. Both of the inadequacy narratives described above lapse into
describing the U.S. antitrust system as regularly succumbing to irrational (or,
as Representative Frenzel put it, insane) swings in behavior, from wild
overreaching in the 1970s and in earlier periods of antitrust history to
excessive restraint from the late 1970s to the present. In their positive
description of why events transpired as they did, the inadequacy narratives
focus heavily on the role of agency leadership and personality. For example,
the excessive enforcement narrative portrays federal enforcement officials in
the 1960s as possessed by a deranged opposition to mergers230 and depicts
Michael Pertschuk, the FTC’s chairman from 1977-1981, as a singularly
malevolent force who drove the agency off the rails. 231 The inadequate
enforcement narrative damns William Baxter, who chaired the DOJ Antitrust
Division from 1981 through 1983, and James C. Miller III, who chaired the
FTC from 1981 to 1984, as irrational extremists with no fidelity to norms
that promote sound policy making.232
The abilities and instincts of individual leaders are undoubtedly
important to the success of a competition authority.233 Yet the personalitydriven explanation for agency behavior overlooks the role that institutional
arrangements have played in shaping outcomes – for example, by
moderating policy impulses of some leaders and creating structures and
mechanisms (such as a program of ex post evaluation of agency decisions)
that improve policy making regardless of who is in charge. The singleminded focus on personalities also obscures the extent to which various
institutional arrangements played central roles in the agency’s achievement
of successful policy outcomes.234 In short, one loses the ability to develop a
230. Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The Revolution vs. the
Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 931, 939 (1988) (officials who designed federal merger
enforcement policies in the 1960s were “the government antitrust witchdoctors”); The New
Enforcers, THE ECONOMIST 125, Oct. 7, 2000 at 125 (depicting federal enforcement officials
as “trust-busting zealots of the 1960s who saw evil in every big company or merger”).
231. See Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1308–10 (discussing pejorative
portrayal of Pertschuk).
232. Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 385–89 (discussing critique of
Reagan-era antitrust officials).
233. William E. Kovacic, Formula for Success: A Formula One Approach to
Understanding Competition Law System Performance, in RECONCILING EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITY – A GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR COMPETITION POLICY 312, 321–23 (Damien Gerard &
Ioannis Lianos eds. 2019) (describing importance of agency leadership to agency
performance).
234. In the case of perceived or actual policy failures, there is a temptation to seek out a
scapegoat for vilification rather than engage in the laborious task of considering how
institutional design and culture may have accounted substantially for observed results.
Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1309–10. There is a tendency in the literature
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better sense of what accounts for policy successes and failures. Replacing a
supposed pariah with a presumed miracle worker may not improve the status
quo by much if deep-seated institutional weaknesses are major sources of
observed policy failures.
Setting Realistic Expectations. By portraying federal enforcement as
prone to horrible lapses, the inadequate activity narrative can warp
perceptions about what the federal agencies are capable of achieving if they
apply maximum effort in carrying out their duties. Consider, again, the
Blumenthal/Wu and Tepper/Hearn statements that federal monopolization
case filings fell from an average of roughly fifteen cases per year from 1970
to 1999 to an average of three cases per year afterwards. 235 These
comparisons might give one the impression that the DOJ and the FTC have
the institutional capacity to bring far more than three monopolization cases
per year and should do so. But what if the peak annual output of DOJ and
FTC monopolization cases since 1970 was an average of three and one-third
cases per year from 1969 through 1976, and the total number of such cases
initiated between 1969 and 1980 was 47? Using the faulty data set to
establish a performance benchmark (i.e., fifteen cases per year) will create
unrealistic targets whose pursuit will cause a large mismatch between agency
commitments and capabilities.236
III. HOW THE QUALITY OF POSITIVE ANALYSIS AFFECTS ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY PERFORMANCE
The discussion above has considered how a flawed grasp of the positive
record of enforcement can distort the competition policy community’s
assessment of the performance of the U.S. antitrust system. The discussion
in this section looks at the quality of positive analysis from another
perspective and asks how weaknesses in positive accounts of enforcement
activity affect the operations of the enforcement agencies themselves. An
important reason to improve the reporting of DOJ and FTC activity is that
about the FTC to portray the agency’s selection of programs as woefully inadequate and to
embrace explanations based on aberrant leadership or general allegations of agency
irrationality to explain deficient policy performance. It is evident that, upon closer study,
the FTC’s program selection in the relevant eras was a good deal better than claimed, and its
performance shortcomings stemmed more from weaknesses in institutional design and
management systems rather than in the quirks of its leaders. Marc Winerman & William E.
Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency: The FTC from 1921-1925, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 145 (2010).
235. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text (analyzing claims of drastic
changes in federal prosecution of monopolization cases from 1970 to present).
236. Hyman & Kovacic, FTC’s Critics, supra note 134, at 1965–67, 1972–73.
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good data opens possibilities for the agencies to make valuable
improvements in enforcement policy. As noted above, caution is warranted
in using levels of activity, in isolation, as measures of agency performance.237
At the same time, accurate data sets on agency activity can serve to improve
antitrust policymaking and enrich discussions – in academic fora, in
professional societies, in legislative hearings, and in popular discourse –
about competition law.
Among other ends, better collection, disclosure, and analysis of
antitrust enforcement data could improve our interpretation of agency action
and inaction; strengthen efforts to address the vital, elusive question of how
antitrust enforcement affects economic performance; enhance agency
processes for initiating projects, especially by placing proposed projects in
the context of an existing portfolio of commitments and to make better
informed judgments regarding the potential gains and risks associated with
each new measure; help illuminate the conditions that increase or reduce the
likelihood that an agency will execute litigation programs successfully;
identify conceptual connections that link what sometimes are treated as
discrete, self-contained areas of antitrust policy; facilitate effective
monitoring of agency operations by legislators and external commentators;
and permit useful comparisons of enforcement policy across jurisdictions.
Better antitrust data can accomplish many of these ends without great
expense. Investments in these activities resemble outlays for operations
research that makes an institution wiser in its selection and execution of
programs. My modest claim is that, in today’s great debate about the future
of the U.S. antitrust system, a stronger foundation of activity-related data can
put the antitrust community in a better position to make sensible normative
judgments about competition policy going forward.
This part presents a case study based upon my experiences as a junior
attorney at the FTC in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was the first of
three tours for me at the FTC, and I use the experience to highlight some of
the problems and possibilities associated with the creation and maintenance
of good data sets on agency activity. Section IV below distills some of the
observations into a more formal framework for collecting and applying
information about agency activity into agency decision making and the
assessment of agency performance.
A. Building Historical Awareness: The FTC in the 1970s
I joined the FTC for the first time in the fall of 1979. At the time, the
237. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies, supra note 1.
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agency’s Bureau of Competition had two policy groups that worked closely
together – a Planning Office headed by John (Jack) Kirkwood, and an Office
of Special Projects led by Albert (Bert) Foer.238 Both offices played a major
role in showing how the Commission could improve its performance by
establishing a more complete understanding of its positive record of activity
and analyzing data on past programs.
THE KIRKWOOD PLANNING OFFICE
A number of assignments in the Planning Office required me to
examine the Commission’s more recent and distant past. Under Kirkwood’s
leadership, the BC Planning Office focused on three interrelated functions:
research projects to support policy development in litigation and nonlitigation projects at the FTC; consultation with Bureau of Competition
litigation teams on existing and proposed antitrust cases; and management
of projects to evaluate the impact of completed FTC antitrust cases. The
intuition supporting this combination of activities was that the Planning
Office could inform policy development most effectively if hands-on
experience with real cases and impact evaluations informed its research
about the development and application of the FTC’s mandate.
As noted above, from the late 1960s through the 1970s, the FTC carried
out an ambitious antitrust and consumer protection program.239 By 19791980, the Commission was besieged on several fronts. 240 The agency
achieved some litigation success, but many of its antitrust cases were
struggling. Some matters that sought to extend doctrinal frontiers faced stout
resistance from the courts of appeals; others plodded laboriously through the
agency’s administrative process, where the best of the nation’s competition
bar and economic experts confronted FTC teams that had great enthusiasm
but considerably less litigation experience.241
Moreover, a Congress that earlier in the decade had demanded boldness
turned against the agency.242 Most of the legislative attacks focused on the
FTC’s consumer protection program, but there were serious threats to
withdraw the agency’s jurisdiction in matters involving professional services
and to bar the Commission from seeking structural relief in cases premised
238. At the time, the FTC also had a separate Office of Policy Planning headed by
Robert Reich, and the agency’s Bureau of Economics had a policy team led by Steven
Salop.
239. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1282–92, 1303–07.
240. Id. at 1308.
241. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1318–19.
242. See supra notes 99-154 and accompanying text (describing political backlash to
activist FTC programs of the 1970s).
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on Section 5 of the FTC Act.243 In 1980 Congress allowed the FTC’s funding
to lapse, requiring the agency to send its employees home for a day.244 As
an indication of the Commission’s precarious political position, VicePresident Walter Mondale, on the day before the presidential election in
November 1980, told a political rally in Battle Creek, Michigan that, if
reelected, he and President Jimmy Carter would seek legislation to bar the
FTC from imposing structural relief upon Kellogg and other breakfast cereal
manufacturers which the FTC had challenged under Section 5 for exercising
collective dominance.245
As the roof was caving in on the agency, there was an intense internal
demand for research to convince courts that the agency’s cases stood on solid
doctrinal and policy ground. In seeking to respond to external attacks, it was
evident inside the FTC that the agency had a weak understanding of what it
had done in the past and why its programs had evolved as they did. Among
other gaps, the agency lacked:
Data that showed how many monopolization or attempted
monopolization cases it had filed, litigated, or settled since its creation.
Data that recorded how often the agency had achieved structural
relief as a remedy for antitrust violations in merger and nonmerger matters.
Data that showed which and how many of its cases had relied mainly
or entirely on the distinctive reach of Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Data that showed the resolution of the FTC’s Section 5 cases on
appeal.
Data that showed overall trends in the types of violations the agency
had prosecuted since its creation.
Nor did the agency have a well-formulated statement of the content and
scope of its authority to prevent unfair methods of competition. In many
meaningful respects, there was surprisingly little systematic institutional
knowledge of what the agency had done and why it had done so. Major gaps
included
The absence of policy statements regarding the FTC’s interpretation
of its authority to bar unfair methods of competition or unfair and deceptive
acts or practices;
The absence of systematic records to identify the Commission’s
most important achievements in the application of its distinctive collection
243. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 664–67.
244. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing lapse in FTC funding).
245. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (describing Vice-President Mondale’s
promise that the Carter administration would seek legislation to block structural relief in
FTC cereal shared monopoly case if Jimmy Carter was elected to serve a second term as
President).
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of policy instruments: administrative adjudication, the collection of business
data and the preparation of studies, the promulgation of rules and guidelines,
and the provision of policy advice to Congress and the Executive Branch;
and
The absence of agency historical studies that analyzed obstacles to
the effective application of the FTC’s powers and identified methods for
surmounting them.
The Foer and Kirkwood offices worked actively in the late 1970s and
early 1980s to fill these gaps. Nearly all of the Planning Office attorneys
wrote and published papers that explored the foundations for the
Commission’s antitrust enforcement program. Neil Averitt authored a
remarkable trilogy of papers on the foundations of the FTC’s authority; these
consisted of studies of the meaning of the agency’s competition law and
consumer protection mandate under Section 5 of the FTC Act and the
availability of structural remedies to cure antitrust violations under the same
statute.246 Robert Lande wrote his famous paper interpreting the aims of
Congress in adopting the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.247 Donald Clark
published a paper on facilitating practices.248 James Hurwitz and I published
a survey of the legal and economic literature on predation as an improper
exclusionary device.249 Ross Petty performed research, published after he
left the FTC, on product innovation as an exclusionary strategy.250 Each of
these projects sought to support FTC antitrust cases underway.251
The Planning Office research program also sought to demonstrate to
Congress that the FTC was not, as Representative William Frenzel asserted
in 1979, “a king-sized cancer on the economy” or “a rogue agency gone
insane.”252 In addition to the papers noted above, the office prepared papers
246. Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts or Practices” in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225 (1981); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of
“Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21
B.C. L. REV. 227 (1980); Neil W. Averitt, Structural Remedies in Competition Cases Under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 40 OHIO ST. L. REV. 781 (1979).
247. Lande, supra note 90.
248. Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of
Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIS. L. REV. 887.
249. James D. Hurwitz & William E. Kovacic, Current Legal Standards of Predation:
The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982).
250. Ross D. Petty, Antitrust and Innovation: Are Product Innovations Ever Predatory?,
22 SUFFOLK L. REV. 997 (1988).
251. For example, Neil Averitt’s research served to clarify the foundations for the legal
theory and claims for relief in the FTC’s shared monopoly cases in the breakfast cereal and
petroleum sectors. The Hurwitz/Kovacic predation research supported the development of
the legal theory in the Commission’s ongoing predatory pricing cases.
252. 125 CONG. REC. H10,757-58 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1979).
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on the history of FTC antitrust enforcement and supervised projects by
academics to evaluate the effects of previous FTC cases. I wrote a history
of congressional oversight of FTC antitrust enforcement and showed that the
FTC’s programs of the 1970s were faithful to congressional guidance about
how the agency should allocate its antitrust resources.253 I also oversaw
Timothy Bresnahan’s evaluation of the FTC’s Xerox 254 monopolization
case,255 while Robert Lande supervised the preparation and publication of
studies of FTC vertical restraints cases.256 In addition to these assignments,
I worked extensively with the Bureau of Competition team responsible for
the agency’s shared monopoly case against the country’s eight leading
petroleum refiners.257
THE FOER OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
In the fall of 1979, the Office of Special Projects organized a program
of “Economic History Seminars” for the FTC’s staff. To prepare the agenda
and recruit presenters, Bert Foer enlisted the Harvard Business School
historian Thomas McCraw, who was in the midst of writing Prophets of
Regulation.258 For the FTC seminars, McCraw persuaded Alfred Chandler,
Bob Cuff, Louis Galambos, and Ellis Hawley to join him in examining the
changing conceptions of competition law and economic regulation in the
United States since the late nineteenth century.
At the time, the Congress and the courts were shoving back hard at the
FTC for its efforts to carry out an ambitious agenda of competition and
consumer protection programs. 259 Among other features, the seminars
recounted the sobering difficulties that the Commission had encountered
since its creation in 1914 in seeking to fulfill its mandate to ban “unfair

253. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107.
254. Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975).
255. Timothy Bresnahan, Post-Entry Competition in the Plain Paper Coper Market, 75
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND PROC.) 2 (1985).
256. FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES (Ronald N. Lafferty, John B. Kirkwood, & Robert H. Lande
eds., 1984).
257. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing FTC’s Exxon shared
monopolization case).
258. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984). The seminar was one of a
number of steps that Bert took to try to inject a greater degree of learning from the agency’s
history into current policymaking. On Bert Foer’s contributions, see William E. Kovacic,
Antitrust in Context: Creating Historical Awareness for Competition Agencies, 60
ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (2015) (detailing how Boer engaged business historians to provide
context for the formation of modern antitrust policy).
259. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1316–17, 1319–20.
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methods of competition” 260 and to apply its exceptional information
gathering powers to study business behavior.261 It would have been most
helpful for the agency’s leadership to have attended such a seminar at the
beginning of the decade as the Commission was deciding which programs to
launch to carry out congressional demands for a sweeping transformation of
the agency.262 In the course of the seminar and extensive discussions on the
margins of the formal sessions, it became apparent that the senior leadership
of the agency, and most of the members of the Commission, knew little about
the origins, aims, and evolution of the institution. One had the impression
that nearly seven decades of knowhow had evaporated, and the agency was
relearning hard lessons all over again.
LESSONS FROM THE COMMISSION’S EXPERIENCE IN THE 1970S
I have several lasting impressions of these experiences. Many concern
the collection and presentation of data, and the quality of earlier scholarship
on the history of the FTC’s competition programs. The research projects of
the Bureau of Competition Planning Office and Office of Special Projects
revealed a surprising lack of systematic data sets on the FTC’s past cases.
The agency did not have a data set, retrievable manually or by the agency’s
nascent electronic records system, that presented the full agenda of existing
cases or a roster of matters going back even a single decade. Under the
supervision of the Office of Special Projects, a Bureau of Competition data
set was compiled from scratch.
The absence of comprehensive, reliable data sets hindered good
decision making by the Commission and its operating units. Throughout the
1970s, the agency added one significant competition or consumer protection
matter after another without a clear idea of the magnitude of existing
commitments and their resource implications and a coherent plan for how
each newly proposed initiative would be carried out.263 These knowledge
gaps created an imbalance between the demands imposed by the execution
of the complex, difficult litigation matters under consideration and the
260. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
261. 15 U.S.C. § 46.
262. The seminar turned out to be a one-off, though the Commission produced an edited
transcript of the 1979 proceedings. See NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORIANS’
PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST AND BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES (Fed.
Trade Comm’n ed., 1981). Each new generation of FTC leadership should study that
transcript. Newly appointed leaders at the FTC and other economic regulators also would
benefit significantly from a short course that addressed the enduring themes of the 1979
seminars.
263. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1317–25.
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capacity of the agency to carry them out skillfully. Without the ability to
study the full portfolio of agency matters in a systematic way, the agency
lacked necessary context in assessing the doctrinal, litigation, and political
risks associated with the entire portfolio. The FTC added far-reaching new
matters to its litigation agenda without concern for the critical mass of
business and political opposition the agency’s programs were catalyzing, or
the demands that the agenda was placing upon the relatively small number
of agency personnel with considerable experience and proficiency in
litigating complex antitrust cases or promulgating trade regulation rules.
Though not the only cause of the political grief and judicial rebukes that the
agency received, the lack of an informative, comprehensive data set
diminished the agency’s ability to make good judgments about which
projects to undertake, and how many projects it could land successfully.
These experiences inspired lasting improvements in data collection and
analysis, yet there is room today for further enhancements. By reason of
their effort and longevity, the U.S. agencies have an unparalleled base of
experience that constitutes antitrust big data. The agencies have not realized
the full potential benefits, in selecting and performing new projects, that
deeper analysis of that data could yield. At a more general level, the agencies
have done less than they might to examine past experience to identify the
characteristics of successful programs and to understand the causes of
program failures. In these and other ways, past experience is an
underexploited resource for policy makers.264 The discussion in Section IV
suggests ways to achieve the benefits that better historically oriented data
collection and analysis can offer.
IV. HISTORICAL DATA-BASED ANALYSIS FOR ANTITRUST AGENCIES:
FOCAL POINTS
Antitrust agencies can help strengthen the positive foundations for
policy development and debate by disclosing a larger amount of useful
information about what they have done and why they have acted as they
have. I make this claim here while recognizing the hazards of suggesting
that certain techniques have broad, or even global, applicability. The
intuition here is that, regardless of where agencies are situated, they stand a
better chance of making future progress toward fulfilling the objectives that
inspired their creation if they have an accurate idea of where they are today

264. See Balleisen & Brake, supra note 30 (advocating for improvements to regulatory
decision-making through increased historical analysis).
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and how they got there.265 The discussion below outlines what a fuller data
collection and disclosure program might entail.
A. Determining What Happened
From scholarly papers, popular commentary, congressional hearings,
judicial decisions, and conversations with specialists in the field, one can
distill myriad criteria with which to answer the question posed at the outset
of this Article: on what basis should the performance of competition agencies
be evaluated? Data useful to answering this question would include: the
number of matters initiated by the agency; the significance of the companies
targeted for lawsuits; the economic impact of agency interventions; litigation
success rates; the impact of agency initiatives upon legal doctrine; the
introduction of useful innovations in policy implementation; the pursuit of
measures to improve procedural fairness; the extent of the agency’s influence
upon global standards; the capability of agency leaders and senior managers
and their standing in the eyes of their competition agency peers, elected
officials, and the general public; legislative approval for higher budgets and
more authority, favorable public perceptions of effectiveness; good news
coverage; and high rankings in external surveys. For a competition agency,
performing well on all or most of these criteria likewise creates an aura of
high quality and reputation for competent public administration.
The measurement of agency performance also should examine whether
the agency is making investments in capacity-building and institutional
development that determine its ability to select projects wisely and carry
effectively. Success in policy making requires that leadership achieves a
balance between “consumption” in the form of cases and rules initiated and
“investment” in expenditures to accumulate knowledge and build
administrative and physical infrastructure that enhance the agency’s ability
to implement programs successfully. 266 In any single budget cycle, the
agency should report on what investments it has made to support the
265. One must be cautious about making strong claims about what is broadly applicable
or appropriate. Professors Edward Iacobucci and Michael Trebilcock make the important
point that the choice and application of evaluative criteria must take account of the goals of
a jurisdiction’s competition regime and the economic, legal, political, and social
environment in which the regime is implemented. Edward M. Iacobucci & Michael J.
Trebilcock, Evaluating the Performance of Competition Agencies: The Limits of Assessment
Methodologies and Their Policy Implications, in RECONCILING EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY: A
GLOBAL CHALLENGE FOR COMPETITION POLICY 327 (Damien Gerard & Ioannis Lianos eds.,
2019).
266. Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 21.
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development of future programs – much in the way that a company reveals
to investors the scope of research and development efforts as a sign of its
capacity to compete in the future.
B. Using Positive Data to Make Normative Assessments
An important aim of collecting positive data is to put the agency (and
external observers) in a good position to evaluate the effects of agency
interventions. An ex post evaluation regime for a competition authority can
enable the agency to improve its diagnosis and treatment of commercial
behavior, 267 as in analyzing the likely competitive consequences of a
merger.268 Ex post normative evaluations generally seek to address three
major issues:
Substance of policy making: Did the agency do the right things: did
it apply its resources wisely? Did its programs achieve good substantive
results? By which criteria should the quality of its resource allocation and
the substantive results of its efforts be assessed?
Process of Policy Making: Did the agency do things the right way:
did it use sound processes, in its internal deliberations and in its engagement
with external groups? By which criteria should its processes be assessed?
Useful Policy Making Reforms: What adjustments are suggested by
past experience?
This type of ex post analysis is facilitated if the agency, at the time of
the decision to intervene, asks the following seven questions and documents
its answers:269
What gains did the agency expect to achieve—such as doctrinal
advances, favorable effects on economic performance—if it succeeded?270

267. William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of
Competition Agencies, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2005).
268. See Dennis W. Carlton, The Need to Measure the Effect of Merger Policy, 22
ANTITRUST 39 (2008) (explaining that value of ex post assessment is to improve accuracy of
prospective analysis of proposed mergers).
269. These are derived from Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 21, at
320-21; Kovacic, Prioritization Principles, supra note 65, at 21–24.
270. For example, in a merger review, one important indication of the anticipated benefit
from intervention is the estimate of competitive harm from the proposed transaction.
Nicolas Kreisle, Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining’s Acquisition of Giant
Industries 2 (Fed. Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 319, 2013, available at https://www.f
tc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/merger-policy-westn-refinings-acquisitiongiant-industries/wp319.pdf ) [https://perma.cc/KKU2-X9VW] (to be meaningful, ex post
evaluations of mergers “can only take place when the antitrust authority has precisely stated
its forecast of any post-merger anticompetitive effect”).
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What risks (e.g., litigation risk, political backlash) does the matter
entail, and how might the agency mitigate them? What might be the adverse
effects for the agency (e.g., establishment of unfavorable doctrine,
reputational harm) if its initiative fails (e.g., the agency is defeated in court)?
Who will perform the project for the agency, and what is the quality
of that team?
How much will the project cost to complete?
How long is the project likely to take?
By what signs will the agency know that the project is working well
or poorly?
How does the project fit within the agency’s existing portfolio of
projects (and how does the proposed project affect the distribution of risk
within the portfolio)?
Focusing on these questions has value that goes beyond the assessment
of completed matters. These queries also assist the agency in making good
management decisions about pending matters—especially in determining
whether there is a good fit between its commitments and its capabilities—
both for the specific project at hand and for its entire portfolio. This helps
prevent major mismatches between the agency’s promises and its ability to
keep them. Identifying gaps between commitments and capabilities helps
guide an agency in making adequate investments in building capability and
serves as a partial deterrent on the part of incumbent managers to make
commitments (whose initiation elicits approval for the incumbent) that are
unlikely to be carried out successfully due to resource or other limitations
(an event that causes harm to the institution over the long term). By this
approach, managers have greater incentives to see that project take-offs are
followed by safe landings.271
The approach described above also can place an agency in a better
position to identify potential political risks of proceeding with specific
matters and to mitigate such risks. In the 1970s and early 1980s, many FTC
matters that enjoyed strong political support when initiated subsequently
faced powerful political opposition. A significant number of major cases
and trade regulation rules took years to develop, and the delays exposed the
Commission to political attacks as the membership of the Congress grew
more hostile to regulatory intervention in the economy.272 Awareness of how
changes in congressional membership can create resistance to ambitious
271. Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 21, at 304–13.
272. Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 121, at 652–53 (describing changes
in Senate membership from 1976 to 1980 that created less hospitable environment for
ambitious FTC competition and consumer matters begun earlier in the 1970s).
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enforcement or rulemaking initiatives can focus the agency’s attention on
how much the successful pursuit of such measures depends upon sustained
political support. An understanding of how political moods change, and
change swiftly, also suggests the importance of discipline in designing
programs to bring them to a conclusion as quickly as possible while a
supportive political coalition holds power.
C. Improving Agency Historical Awareness
What does a system of regulation gain by trying to answer these
questions and apply historical knowledge to contemporary decision making?
Perhaps it establishes systematic approaches to do what Professors Neustadt
and May term “thinking in time streams”? 273 This section suggests how
historical awareness can improve regulatory agency performance. The
discussion also presents the limitations of historical research, including
methodological obstacles and behavioral phenomena that require care in
assessing the reliability of individual historical studies.
BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF LEARNING
As noted above, learning is a vital source of proficiency for any
institution, including regulatory bodies. I came to see the value of
institutional learning vividly in three years with a law firm working for
clients in the aerospace and defense industry. From 1983 to 1986, I worked
extensively on projects for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and I spent
many hours with engineers who designed and built aircraft and space launch
vehicles. Many of my counterparts had been with the company since the
early 1950s; they had worked on several aircraft programs that had long
production runs. One of my closest professional acquaintances had worked
on each of the programs that had made McDonnell Douglas a major supplier
to the U.S. Department of Defense and to armed forces around the world:
The F-101, the F-4, the F-15, and the F-18.274
My McDonnell Douglas colleagues emphasized two points. First, the
careful assessment of experience, good and bad, informed decisions about
the next project. By studying what worked and what did not, the company
achieved steady (and often spectacular) improvements in performance from
one generation of aircraft to the next. The second point concerned the
development of better institutional judgment. One colleague told me that, in
273. NEUSTADT & MAY, THINKING IN TIME, supra note 31, at 247–70.
274. The history of these programs is recounted in BILL YENNE, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS –
A TALE OF TWO GIANTS (1985).

2020]

KEEPING SCORE

113

contemplating a new aircraft design, the company had well-proven solutions
to ninety percent of the problems it would confront. The crucial issue was
whether the design and production team could solve the ten percent of
problems for which no immediate solution was apparent. For example, could
the company achieve full scale production of an experimental light-weight
material that, if eventually available in large quantities and at acceptable
cost, would dramatically reduce weight and enable the company to extend
the range and payload of a new aerospace system? Past experience provided
an invaluable guide to answer the question, both in terms of suggesting
technical methods to reduce and resolve uncertainties, and in sharpening a
more intangible institutional intuition about whether problems could be
overcome.
In my time at the FTC, I saw this phenomenon at work in the agency’s
competition and consumer protection programs. One notable illustration
concerned the agency’s introduction, in 2003, of the Telemarketing Sales
Rule, known as the Do-Not-Call (DNC) rule.275 The introduction of the DNC
regime required the FTC to surmount three significant obstacles: to
overcome objections that the DNC rule, which enabled consumers to enlist
the FTC’s assistance in blocking unwanted telemarketing calls,
impermissibly restricted commercial speech; to devise a system that could
accurately register large numbers of telephone numbers (the DNC registry
today includes roughly 229 million numbers); and to withstand severe
political opposition generated by lobbying from telemarketing service
providers and their principal trade associations. The successful resolution of
these issues stemmed significantly from the careful application of twenty
years of experience with consumer protection rulemaking, with litigation
involving the compatibility of FTC antitrust and consumer protection orders
with First Amendment free speech guarantees; and with repeated encounters
with Congress over specific applications of the Commission’s mandate.276
Learning did two things: it showed the agency how to solve problems the
FTC could readily anticipate in promulgating the DNC rule, and it gave the
Commission confidence that it could cope successfully with uncertainties
that would arise as the DNC was implemented.
Reflection on its rulemaking experience also indicated to the
275. 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2003); see also Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC, 358
F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting challenges to implementation of FTC Telemarketing
Sales Rule).
276. Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection:
Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 927-38 (2005);
William MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its
Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 964–67 (2005).
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Commission what steps it would have to take to issue an effective DNC rule.
Perhaps the most important measure was the assignment of an
extraordinarily capable manager, Lois Greisman, to lead the project.
Greisman had extensive experience working in the Bureau of Consumer
Protection and as the chief of staff to two FTC chairmen, Robert Pitofsky
and Timothy Muris. Under Greisman’s leadership, the agency assembled a
team of its best professionals and technicians from across the agency – the
Bureau of Consumer Protection, the Executive Director’s office, the Office
of the General Counsel, the Office of Congressional Relations, and the
Office of Public Affairs – to formulate, implement, and defend the rule. A
sophisticated understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of earlier FTC
rulemaking projects informed all aspects of the DNC endeavor.
In setting out the benefits of learning, it is necessary to identify
problems that impede effective learning. Even a regulatory institution
dedicated to make the fullest possible use of historical awareness confronts
serious difficulties in determining what happened in the past, knowing why
it happened, understanding its effects, and forming a judgment about whether
past practice made things better or worse. These tasks involve often tricky
questions associated with the collection and interpretation of information.
The modern literature on behavioral economics and psychology has
highlighted forces that can distort historical analysis and render it
meaningless, or harmful.277 Here are just a few complications. The willing
student of the past may be overwhelmed with information, even for a single
regulatory agency. To take one example, there is an immense body of
information about the Federal Trade Commission—agency decisions,
orders, guidelines, speeches, rules, oral histories, collections of papers of key
agency officials and influential outsiders, and an Everest of commentary on
the institution.278 Even before facing hard questions of interpretation, the
researcher can despair at the difficulty of creating a data set that consistently
and accurately tracks the agency’s activity over time. And these efforts,
focusing solely on the FTC, do not take the additional useful step of
comparing the Commission to other regulatory institutions at home or
abroad.
One common response to information overload is to resort to badly
277. James Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for
Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 779 (2012); James Cooper &
William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory Agency Behavior,
41 J. REG. ECON. 41 (2012).
278. See William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes
Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1034–35 (2012) (noting volume of attention devoted by
commentators to the FTC).
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imperfect rules of thumb (heuristics).279 The historical inquiry can flounder
because the chosen methodological rules of thumb distort data collection
terribly and yield unreliable interpretations. Confirmation bias can induce
the researcher or the user of historical analysis to ignore or deemphasize
information and interpretations that contradict a preferred hypothesis. 280
Proponents of historical research as a guide to regulatory decision making
must acknowledge the frequency with which papers that invoke history to
support policy prescriptions are seeking to create what Professor Ernst has
called a “historically usable past,”281 a form of brief-writing that showcases
favored authorities and sidesteps contrary or inconsistent decisions.
Even when researchers and the users of historical analysis try their best
to control for confirmation bias, other behavioral phenomena can get in the
way. Availability bias can cause the regulator to attach undue significance
to a very salient adverse event, such as the loss of a major case in court.282
Rather than engaging in a dispassionate assessment of went wrong and
devising solutions to do better the next time, the agency may recoil from a
specific line of endeavor entirely and pass up valuable opportunities to
intervene more wisely and effectively in the policy arena in which things
turned out badly the last time.
HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND POLICY INTEGRATION
There is no single history of regulatory events, no single accounting of
what the agency did, no single interpretation of the agency’s behavior, and
no single assessment of the worth of the agency’s work. An agency exhorted
to take fuller account of history might properly ask, “Which history?”
In no particular order, here are some of the difficulties associated with
examining the past to guide future policy development. First, although a
good data set can raise provocative questions about why an agency has
reallocated enforcement resources over time, the relevant data about what
happened may be badly incomplete or not readily accessible. For example,
data on the federal government’s enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act
279. See James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics: Implications
for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41, 44–46 (2012) (describing concept of
heuristics and applying it to regulatory agency behavior).
280. Id. at 47 (describing concept of confirmation bias).
281. Ernest, supra note 75, at 883.
282. Id. at 45 (describing concept of availability bias). In reflecting on my time at the
FTC in the late 1970s and early 1980s, I am aware that the experience of working on failed
competition cases, and observing the cascade of opprobrium from courts, legislators, and
commentators that swamped the agency in that period, imbued me with caution about taking
major doctrinal risks in the development of new cases or rules.
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since 1960 presents a picture of dramatic change in enforcement policy -- a
decline from dozens of FTC cases per year in the 1960s to a total of two
cases over the past twenty years, and none since 2000.283 Constructing a
reliable data set on federal R-P enforcement requires a laborious examination
of press releases and professional publications that compile digests of federal
enforcement actions.284
Competition agencies vary dramatically in how they collect and present
data on activity. 285 Some agencies give more complete information for
litigation matters (citations and links to the event that began a case, reports
of decisions taken by the agency, and decisions issued by appellate bodies);
others simply report aggregates of activity (e.g., in calendar year 2017, the
agency commenced 11 matters involving vertical restraints).286 Aggregate
statistics can be intriguing, but they are terribly incomplete if not backed up
with tables that indicate what matters are included in the aggregate numbers.
Researchers who wish to obtain an accurate idea of what lies behind the
aggregate numbers often must attempt to assemble the supporting
information on cases from the ground up – e.g., by reading agency press
releases and external news accounts. A poverty of good data, and the general
absence of widely accepted reporting norms, seriously impede good
historical research regarding economic regulation.
What can we say about the state of antitrust data, and our understanding
of what happened, if leading agencies in the field report activity in this
sketchy manner? Competition agencies could take a useful first step toward
better disclosure simply by revealing their data-reporting methodology more
283. See D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson Patman, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064
(2015) (presenting data on federal Robinson-Patman enforcement and providing
interpretations for policy adjustments since early 1960s).
284. See Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 407–10 (discussing
methodological issues associated with preparing a profile of enforcement activity).
285. Kovacic et al., Measure Up?, supra note 37, at 40–43.
286. An example is the DOJ’s Ten-Year Workload Statistics, which compile aggregate
data on investigations and case filings. These are available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/div
ision-operations [https://perma.cc/3FPE-C9J9] . The Workload Statistics for fiscal years
1970-1979 report that the Department filed 62 cases involving oligopolies and monopolies.
https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-division-workload-statistics-fy-1970-1979 [https://per
ma.cc/RW2E-KC86]. These are presented without a table of cases that shows what matters
are included in the tabulations. My own research, which involved reading each DOJ press
release issued during this period and reviewing case digests published in commercial
reporting services, indicates that the number of DOJ cases from fiscal years 1970-1979 that
were based mainly on claims of Sherman Act Section 2 violations was fewer than twenty.
Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 449. A researcher who has not retraced the
Department’s steps in this manner could hardly be blamed for thinking the relevant number
of cases is closer to sixty than to twenty.
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completely. My minimum proposition here is that better data reporting by
the antitrust agencies would provide a more certain basis for tracking activity
and for discussions, inside the agency and by the external competition policy
community, about what the agency has done.
A second consideration related to data is how the agencies use data at
their disposal to refine their enforcement programs. In the area of cartel
enforcement, one could imagine that the DOJ would do reconstructions of
cartel episodes to identify how the cartel was formed and managed: Who
took the decision to form the collusive scheme? Did top management
instruct subordinates to form the cartel, or send less direct signals that lower
level managers should do whatever it takes to meet profit expectations?
What mechanisms (such as resale price maintenance) did the firm put in
place to implement the cartel’s plans? It appears that the chief imperative
for a cartel prosecutor is to prove the fact of agreement and then move to the
calculation of punishment levels. The reconstruction of the cartel’s origins
and operations does not appear to be a priority.287
Better data sets could give agencies a stronger sense of the size of the
inventory of litigation matters an agency must maintain if it wishes to shape
doctrine through the courts. Data analysis can help show how many of
agency’s matters settle or make their way through an initial decision and
appeals. An aim of the FTC in the early 2000s was to use administrative and
district court litigation to adjust doctrine.288 At the peak, the Commission
had approximately nine competition matters on its part III administrative
litigation docket. 289 The intuition of agency leadership was that this
inventory of matters was necessary to ensure that there would be a relatively
steady stream of cases making their way to the court of appeals.
Looking at proposed matters in their historical context also can give an
agency a better sense of the difficulty it will face in persuading courts to
endorse its view of the evidence and the law. Today some commentators
have proposed that litigation applying Section 5 of the FTC act be a principal
vehicle for policing business conduct, especially single-firm behavior, more
287. Kovacic et al., Serial Collusion, supra note 20, at 340–42.
288. More Than Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools – A Conversation with Tim
Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 834–35 (2005) (comments by former FTC
Chairman Muris regarding Commission’s efforts to use administrative litigation in
competition cases in early 2000s).
289. The relevant matters include three horizontal restraints cases (Polygram, Schering,
and North Texas Specialty Physicians), three cases involving consummated mergers
(Chicago Bridge & Iron, Evanston Hospital, and MSC Software), one case involving state
action immunity (South Carolina State Board of Dentists), and two monopolization cases
(Unocal and Rambus).
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closely.290 Since its creation over a century ago, the FTC has yet to prevail
in the Supreme Court in a case alleging monopolization, attempted
monopolization, or collective dominance.291 The data leads one to pose a
difficult question: why has the agency not achieved better results, and why
will its prospects improve in the future?
These are but a few areas for the development of what one might call
antitrust analytics – the detailed study of an agency’s experience base as a
way of guiding future enforcement. The increasing attention to ex post
evaluation is an encouraging manifestation of the agencies’ interest in
documenting initial expectations before the enforcement event and matching
those expectations against observed marketplace behavior after enforcement
takes place.292
Even if data were perfect, a good deal of the result of a historical inquiry
would turn upon interpretation and assessment. These processes can be
highly subjective and influenced by the narrator’s own policy preferences
and experiences.293 Commentators who have worked inside an agency, for
example, probably have a better understanding of what agencies do and why
they do it, compared to a researcher with no experience inside a regulator.
Current or former insiders also may have information about cases or other
projects that is inaccessible to external observers. Agency insiders also may
be inclined to recite events in a way that depicts the insiders’ term of office
favorably. The interpretation offered, therefore, may not be entirely (or even
partly) reliable.
Severe bias can arise from sources other than professional experience
inside an agency. The narrator may have a strong policy preference arising
from the representation of clients before the regulator, or from previous
research in which the commentator has staked out a position and thus may
feel the need to justify positions already taken. Here, too, the narrative may
290. Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A Comprehensive Charter of Economic
Liberty”: The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 645,
684–88 (2017).
291. This observation is based upon a review that Marc Winerman and I performed of all
periodic compilations that the FTC has prepared since its creation of cases litigated in the
federal courts.
292. One noteworthy and laudable example is the series of papers on merger control
organized by FTC economist Malcolm Coate and written by Coate and various co-authors.
The papers are collected at FTC, Economic Issues Papers available at https://www.ftc.gov/p
olicy/reports/policy-reports/economics-research/issue-papers [https://perma.cc/NC9U-Y2P
8].
293. See William E. Kovacic, Review of Antitrust Stories (E.Fox & D. Crane eds,
Foundation Press 2007), 4 COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL 241, 257–63 (No. 1, Spring
2008) (discussing biases that can affect a first-person narrator’s version of events).
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not reflect an entirely sound or reliable interpretation or assessment of
events.
The skills of a professional historian – either an employee of an agency
or an academic consultant – may be necessary to assist the agency in deciding
what weight to give to historical commentary. The historian also may be in
a position to identify strands of thought that are often repeated but demand a
rethink. Because of their lack of professional training and their uneven grasp
of the relevant literature, economists and lawyers who write historically
oriented pieces may take at face value views that a professional historian
would treat with more skepticism.294
One sees this phenomenon in the drafting of blue-ribbon commission
studies, where lawyers are pressed into service to provide historical context
for the regulatory scheme in question.295 Owing to the need to complete
work in a relatively short time, the drafter of a blue ribbon study may take
short cuts that a historian would abhor – for example, reading a handful of
unrepresentative treatments of the subject, or emphasizing the views of a
writer who has a bias that is unknown to the author but recognized by the
historian.
The 1969 Report of the American Bar Association to Study the Federal
Trade Commission is an example of this tendency. 296 The report was
prepared in barely five months, and the authors seem to have skimmed the
historical literature on the FTC, giving decisive effect to one work that was
strong in some areas but weak in others.297 The resulting study gave a highly
influential, but badly flawed, account of the agency’s earlier work and
missed important explanations, beyond timidity, incompetence, and sloth,
for the agency’s seemingly weak performance from 1915 to the late 1960s.298
D. Historical Analysis: Gains from Fuller Application
This section describes how regulators, sometimes working alone and
sometimes in affiliation with external partners such as university research
centers, can improve the base of historically relevant knowledge for policy

294. For example, professional historians are more deeply versed in methodological
techniques that enable a researcher to identify and canvass relevant materials and to give
appropriate weight to each piece of historical evidence. Research that involves a
collaboration between professional historians and laypersons can overcome this difficulty.
295. Hyman & Kovacic, FTC’s Critics, supra note 134, at 1967–69.
296. Hyman & Kovacic, FTC’s Critics, supra note 134, at 1967.
297. Id. at 1867–69.
298. Id.
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making.299 One starting point is for regulators to make greater use of data
analytics based on information within the agency’s own walls. The insights
derived from the agency’s own research can be augmented by studying the
experience of similar institutions globally.
Another frontier for analysis is to study the causes of policy success and
failure more carefully. Such an examination likely would point more clearly
to institutional design and capability as determinants of project outcomes.
This direction for research would provide a valuable counterpoint to critical
accounts that portray the DOJ and the FTC as lacking courage, rationality,
or imagination in exercising their powers.300 These narratives overlook the
extent to which underinvestment in institutional capacity can doom agency
projects. 301 The dismal accounts of the U.S. experience also emphasize
philosophy as a crucial influence on system performance; everything hinges
on the political preferences of agency appointees.302 In all of these accounts,
the role of institutional arrangements gets inadequate attention, and the
extent to which good agency programs have built upon long periods of
incremental investment and testing is slighted.303
An analytical approach more attuned to the formative influence of
institutional considerations would show, I believe, that the FTC’s antitrust
program of the 1970s was not irrationally interventionist, but that the agency
failed grievously to match its commitments to its capabilities. 304 The
contributions of some leaders who have served at the DOJ and the FTC in
the past forty years would receive greater recognition when their significance
is seen in the context of the agency’s larger history. Anne Bingaman’s stock
would rise by reason of her establishment of the modern DOJ leniency
program in 1993 and her creation of the productivity-enhancing honors
paralegal program.305 William Baxter would receive additional credit for
299. Universities are one group of institutions whom Professor Allan Fels, the former
chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, has termed coproducers. By cooperating with co-producers, competition agencies can increase their
effectiveness.
300. See supra Section II (discussing critiques that attack the FTC for inadequate and
excessive enforcement, respectively).
301. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1333 (describing how institutional
weaknesses, including failures to ensure a good fit between program commitments and
administrative and professional infrastructure undermined FTC programs).
302. William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Influence on Global Competition
Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1157, 1171–83 (2015) (criticizing personality-driven
interpretations of competition agency performance)
303. Id. at 1183-90.
304. Kovacic, Broadest Sense, supra note 107, at 1309–10, 1317–25.
305. Assistant Attorney General Bingaman described her honors paralegal program in
her first appearance as AAG before the Annual Spring Meeting of the American Bar
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bringing the AT&T monopolization case to a successful end; Baxter brought
a few Section 2 cases of his own. Nonetheless, he conceived the remedial
solution in the AT&T matter – a result so important for the future of the
information services and equipment sector – that eluded his immediate
predecessors.306
E. Case Reconstructions307
The inadequate enforcement narrative of modern US antitrust policy
often is anchored upon decisions taken by the FTC regarding Google over
the past fifteen years.308 In 2007, Google purchased DoubleClick, and in
2009 the company bought AdMob.309 The FTC reviewed both transactions
and challenged neither.310
Perhaps the event most often identified as a missed opportunity for
intervention is the Commission’s decision In January 2013 to close a
monopolization investigation of Google, focused on the company’s search
practices (“Google Search”). 311 The FTC’s inquiry had attracted
Association’s Section of Antitrust Law. 60 Minutes with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 63 ANTITRUSTE L.J. 323,
325 (1994). At the same meeting, she described the introduction of the Department’s
enhanced leniency program. Id. at 329–30.
306. Kovacic, Modern Evolution, supra note 25, at 455–56.
307. The discussion here is adapted in part from William Kovacic, Roads Not Taken:
The Federal Trade Commission and Google, Concurrentialiste (Mar. 9, 2020), available at
leconcurrentialiste.com/William-kovacic-ftc-google [https://perma.cc/J8LP-DVNL].
308. See, e.g., SALLY HUBBARD, MONOPOLY SUCKS 89-91 (2020) (criticizing FTC
failure to challenge Google’s acquisitions of DoubleClick and Admob and for decision in
2013 not to bring a monopolization case against Google).
309. Louise Story & Miguel Helft, Google Buys DoubleClick for $3.1 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/14/technology/14DoubleClick.ht
ml
[https://perma.cc/CE6C-KUWG]; Rob Hof, Google Buys Admob to Boost Mobile
Ads, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-11-08/go
ogle-buys-admob-in-bid-to-boost-mobile-ads [https://perma.cc/X6UD-6HSW].
310. Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Federal Trade Commission Closes
Googler/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec. 20, 2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2007/12/federal-trade-commission-closes-googledoubleclick-investiga
tion [https://perma.cc/4A6N-BWDY]; Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, FTC
Cloeses its Investigation of Google Admob Deal (May 21, 2010), available at https://www.ft
c.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/05/ftc-closes-its-investigation-google-admob-deal [h
ttps://perma.cc/N3M5-TD6Z].
311. Federal Trade Commission, Press Release, Google Agrees to Change its Business
Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart
Phones, games, and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), available at https://www.f
tc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-reso
lve-ftc [https://perma.cc/E55H-EPRN].
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considerable public attention, in part because the agency had assembled a
team of prominent experts to help develop and support the prosecution of a
possible case.312 On January 3, 2013, the FTC closed its search inquiry and
announced that Google had submitted a letter in which it promised to amend
some aspects of its conduct.313 By accepting Google’s letter and not insistng
that Google’s commitments be embodied in a consent order, the Commission
in effect used a much-criticized method of using an assurance of voluntary
compliance to resolve concerns about business behavior.314 Scolding his
colleagues for not incorporating Google’s promises in an enforceable order,
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch said the agency had promised an elephant
and instead “brought forth a couple of mice.”315
The FTC decisions not to prosecute in DoubleClick, AdMob, and
Google Search attracted, and continue to elicit, severe criticism. 316
Commentators today argue that the DoubleClick and AdMob episodes
exemplify feeble merger control and demonstrate the disregard of federal
antitrust authorities to the competitive dangers of vertical deals.317 Many
observers contend that the FTC’s agency’s retreat in the Google Search
matter and its failure to oppose mergers by Google and other tech giants
reveal the indifference of the US antitrust system to dominant firm
misconduct.318
312. One of the most notable figures to join the agency at this time was Professor Tim
Wu, who portrayed his own arrival as a way to inject needed vigor into an underperforming
antitrust program. In an interview soon after he was appointed to join the FTC as an advisor
on competition policy issues, Professor Wu said the FTC had been “quieted during the
[George W.] Bush years almost to the point of nonexistence.” Marc Perry, Tim Wu Tries to
Save the Internet , CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Mar. 20, 2011), www.chronicle.com
/article/Can-Tim-Wu-Save-the-Internet.-/126756/ [https://perma.cc/HJ4R-TQFV].
313. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (FTC press release announcing that
agency had closed its inquiry into Google’s search practices; also announcing that Google
had provided FTC with letter indicating that the company would change aspects of its
behavior).
314. See Am. Bar Ass’n, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 134, at 1, 22–23, (describing and criticizing FTC’s reliance
on assurances of voluntary compliance to remedy business misconduct).
315. J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Concurring and
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding Google’s Search
Practices, In re Matter of Google, Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2012), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/concurring-and-dissenti
ng-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103goog
lesearchstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HTJ-PRC8].
316. See HUBBARD, MONOPOLY SUCKS, supra not 308, at 89 (criticizing FTC failure in
2013 to not prosecute Google for monopolization).
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., STOLLER, GOLIATH, supra note 8. at 437–38, 445–49 (chastising FTC for
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Some modern assessments of US antitrust policy might be more
favorable if the FTC had opposed the DoubleClick and AdMob transactions
and sued Google for monopolizing search. The FTC would have taken a
seemingly tough approach to vertical mergers, and, by bringing the search
case, would have been the first competition agency (ahead of the European
Commission) to mount a major monopolization challenge to the new
generation of tech giants.319 In the global competition law arena, the US
program probably would have assumed preeminence in the conversation
about how antitrust law can address allegations of improper exclusion by
giants in the digital economy.
That is not what happened. Instead, the FTC’s inaction in the
DoubleClick and Admob mergers and its decision not to prosecute In the
Google search matter today fuel critiques that ridicule the US federal
antitrust enforcement system. The closure of the Google Search inquiry has
inspired speculation about why the FTC, after a public relations buildup that
signaled intervention, stood down. 320 Discussion has focused on three
possible explanations: (1) Based on a sound assessment of the facts and
prevailing US doctrine governing dominant firm conduct, the Commission
concluded it had no sustainable theory of liability, (2) The Commission had
a supportable case but lost its nerve – the antitrust equivalent of what we call
choking in sports, or (3) The Commission caved in to political pressure that
Google brought to bear through the Congress and the White House.321 My
interpretation is that the first of these possible explanations accurately
depicts the motivation for the FTC’s decision on Google Search: the agency
stood down because it believed the case lacked sufficient merit and was
destined to fail in court.
I am not a neutral bystander in discussing the events described above.
As an FTC commissioner in 2007, I voted not to intervene in the
DoubleClick and AdMob mergers.322 When I left the Commission in early
failure to sue Google for acquisitions that created or reinforced market power); TEACHOUT,
BREAK ‘EM UP supra note 8, at 52–56, 62-64 (same); HUBBARD, MONOPOLY SUCKS, supra
note 308, at 89-91 (same).
319. The European Commission brought its first exclusionary practices case against
Google in June 2017. European Commission, Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping)
(June 27, 2017), available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/3974
0/39740_14996_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKD6-V2TP].
320. HUBBARD, MONOPOLY SUCKS, supra note 308, at 89; DAYEN, MONOPOLIZED, supra
note 11, at 284–85.
321. Id.
322. For the FTC’s closing statement in the Google/DoubleClick transaction, see
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/DoubleClick (Dec. 20,
2007), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/0
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October 2011, the Google Search investigation was underway. A probing
evaluation of the FTC’s performance in these (and other) matters is entirely
appropriate. The discussion below suggests how to advance the debate about
the FTCs decisions in DoubleClick, AdMob, and Google Search and, more
generally, to understand and evaluate the decisions of the US antitrust
agencies.
More Complete Disclosure. When the European Commission closes a
matter without taking action, it typically issues a detailed written explanation
about why it did not intervene.323 US law does not oblige the DOJ or the
FTC to issue closing statements. The historical custom of the US agencies
generally has been not to explain decisions not to prosecute.324 On some
occasions since the late 1990s the agencies have issued detailed closing
statements that provided valuable insights into agency decision making.325
On most occasions, the agencies have released no explanations for closing
investigations or have published largely uninformative comments. When
they say nothing, or very little, the US agencies miss opportunities to
improve public understanding of, and confidence in, how they formulate
antitrust policy.326
71220googledc-commstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH2F-5ZWT] (“The Federal Trade
Commission has voted 4-1 to close its investigation of Google’s 1 proposed acquisition of
DoubleClick after a thorough examination of the evidence bearing on the transaction.”).
323. William E. Kovacic, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Damien Neven, Merger Control
Procedures and Institutions: A Comparison of EU and US Practice, 54 ANTITRUST BULL.
59, 89-90 (2014).
324. Warren Grimes, Transparency in Fedearl Antitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFFALO L.
REV. 937, 944 (2003); William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy:
The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 145 (Spring
2009).
325. See, e.g., FTC, Statement Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd/P&O Princess
Cruises plc and Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises plc, FTC File No. 021 0041
(Oct. 4, 2002) (statement by Commission majority of reasons for closing investigation of
cruise lines merger), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0210041/royal-caribbean-cruises-ltdpo-princess-cruises-plc-carnival [https://perma.cc/XV8B9ETS].
326. From my own experiences in working inside and with government antitrust
agencies, I am aware of the reasons why public officials are sometimes reluctant to issue
informative closing statements. Preparing a good closing statement consumes staff
resources that otherwise could be used in developing other cases. Despite disclaimers in a
closing statement, parties in future matters will seek to argue to courts that analytical
approaches and conclusions revealed in closing statements constitute binding precedents
from which an agency should not be allowed to deviate in the future. And an agency’s
candid revelation of the bases for its decision to close a file exposes it to second-guessing
from outsiders. I do not believe these reasons justify an agency’s decision to forego
meaningful disclosure of its reasoning – at least when it has devoted significant effort to a
matter – but it is important to understand the institutional forces that discourage more
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A more detailed FTC closing statement in Google Search might have
helped persuade external observers that the agency acted in a principled, and
not politically expedient, manner. Such a closing statement would have
enriched national and global discussions about how to apply monopolization
law to dominant platform owners. Instead, the Commission’s Google Search
closing statement was sketchy and at times almost incoherent. This may
reflect the difficulty of distilling different and often conflicting views of a
board majority into a single document. As FTC chair from March 2008 to
March 2009, I hardly can claim to have met the performance standard that I
present here.
In 2015, doubts about the FTC’s decision in Google search intensified.
In responding to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the FTC
inadvertently released every other page of an internal memorandum prepared
by case handlers on the Google inquiry team.327 To some observers, the
document shows that the Commission foolishly ignored the staff’s view that
a good monopolization case was there for the taking.328 The Commission
has declined to release the complete staff memorandum or other internal
records regarding the agency’s decision not to intervene.329
The harsh questioning of the agency’s behavior has diminished the
perceived legitimacy of the Commission’s decision making. This condition
dictates a rethink of the agency’s disclosure policy. The FTC should place
the full version of the staff memo in the public domain, along with the
recommendations to the Commission made by the Bureau of Competition,
the Bureau of Economics, and the General Counsel on Google Search.330
Based on my reading of the materials released to date, my knowledge of the
relevant officials (an especially capable group with no predisposition to
complete disclosure.
327. Brody Mullins, Rolfe Winkler & Brent Kendall, Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of
Google, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-u-s-antitrustprobe-of-google-1426793274 [https://perma.cc/B92G-9GX4].
328. Kara Swisher, The Justice Department’s Lawsuit Against Google: Too Little, Too
Late, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/20/opinion/googlejustice-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/WAB5-W5M8].
329. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez and
Commissioners Julie Brill and Maureen K. Ohlhausen regarding the Google Investigation
(Mar. 25, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/statementchairwoman-edith-ramirez-commissioners-julie-brill-maureen-k [https://perma.cc/Y8XV44SU].
330. I acknowledge the administrative law complications of this suggested course of
action. If I were reviewing this proposal while acting as the FTC’s General Counsel, a
position I held from 2001 to 2004, I might not be so fond of the idea. I recommend it in this
instance because I regard the benefits of disclosure for public policy, and for the well-being
of the FTC, to be greater the potential harms.
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avoid enforcement), and my understanding of the agency’s norms, I believe
the disclosure of these records will not show that the Commission abandoned
a compelling case for intervention. Most important, fuller disclosure of
materials concerning the Commission’s decision would help allay the
apprehension of many observers that the political pressure paralyzed the
FTC.331
Case Reconstructions. Fuller disclosure of the FTC’s Google Search
records would be one part of a broader retrospective review of Commission
decision-making. One element of this review would be a discussion with
FTC officials who participated in the Google Search inquiry and may have
insights into the thought processes that led the agency to close the matter in
2013.332 This assessment might first be done within the agency and then
repeated in a public forum. Key subjects for study are the factors the agency
considered, the weight assigned to each factor, and, more generally, the
benefits and risks that the agency associated with each course of action.
The DoubleClick and AdMob transactions also would be worthy
candidates for retrospective case studies. It would be helpful to consult
officials from other competition agencies (such as the Competition
Directorate of the European Commission) which also reviewed and cleared
the transactions. Here, as well, a retrospective study could collect the views
academic researchers, advisors to the parties, company executives,
complainants who appeared before the FTC, and advocacy group
representatives.
These and other case reconstructions can improve future decision331. If it chooses to release these materials, the Commission could redact passages that
contain proprietary business data or reveal the identities of individuals or firms that
provided information to the agency upon a promise of confidentiality.
332. It might be especially helpful to hear from experts, such as Professor Tim Wu, who
came to the Commission at the time of the Google search inquiry in the expectation of being
part of a significant expansion of antitrust enforcement. Upon his appointment in 2011 to
serve as a senior advisor to the Commission, Professor Wu observed that the George W.
Bush administration had “quieted” the agency “almost to the point of nonexistence.” Perry,
supra note 312. Wu later defended the agency’s resolution of the Google Search
investigation. Tim Wu, Why Does Everyone Think Google Beat the FTC?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Jan. 5, 2013), at https://newrepublic.com/article/111650/why-does-eveeryone-think-googlebeat-ftc [https://perma.cc/LN3B-W6WR]. More recently, in applauding the Justice
Department’s filing of a monopolization complaint against Google, Professor Wu observed
that the DOJ case “marks return of the U.S. Government to a role that many of us long
feared it had abandoned: disciplining the country’s largest and most powerful firms.” Tim
Wu, Google, you cannot buy your way out of this, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/10/22/opinion/google-lawsuit-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/Y2YA-SC
UK]. Professor Wu would be an excellent observer to recount the state of mind that led the
agency to back away from a Google case in 2013.
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making by illuminating how the agency went about analyzing difficult issues
in complex, dynamic commercial sectors. In particular, case reconstructions
can identify how agencies account for litigation risk in assessing potential
cases. This exercise can be a valuable ingredient in evaluating agency
performance. The study of an agency’s risk preference looks beyond case
counts and won-lost records and instead focuses attention on the standards
that should inform judgments about weighing the potential gains and losses
from proposed enforcement matters. This perspective also can help an
agency determine whether it has the means to pursue proposed cases
successfully.
The Google/Doubleclick episode would offer interesting perspectives
on how the FTC’s evaluation of litigation risks and rewards affected its
decision. An ex post study could reconstruct the larger context surrounding
the agency’s decisions not to intervene and thus would facilitate a more
richly informed discussion about whether the agency’s assumptions and
decision-making calculus were sound. In the nine months before the FTC
decided in late December 2007 not to challenge the Google/DoubleClick
deal, the FTC had lost three consecutive preliminary injunction actions in
federal district court to block mergers: Western Refining/Giant Industries
(April 2007),333 Equitable Resources/Peoples Natural Gas (May 2007),334
and Whole Foods/Wild Oats (August 2007).335 In two of these matters, the
FTC achieved some of its remedial aims on appeal, but those more favorable
outcomes for the Commission were not entirely foreseeable when the FTC
took its decision on Google/DoubleClick.336 I feared that the Commission
would suffer serious institutional damage (notably, the further erosion of its
credibility and deterrence as a prosecutor) from a fourth straight defeat in a
merger preliminary injunction action. I believed the Commission’s
prospects of success were weak because the agency would have premised its
333. FTC v. Foster, 2007 WL 1793441 (D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2007).
334. FTC v. Equitable Resources, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 361 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
335. FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
336. In the Equitable Resources/Peoples Natural Case litigation, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in late May 2007 granted the FTC’s motion for an injunction
against the merger pending appeal. FTC v. Equitable Resources, Inc., No. 07-3499, Order
at 1 (3d Cir., May 21, 2007). After briefing and oral argument and pending a decision by
the court of appeals, the parties abandoned the transaction. In February 2008, the Third
Circuit granted the FTC’s motion for a suggestion of mootness and its request to vacate the
decision of the district court. FTC v. Equitable Resources, Inc., No. 07-2499, Order at 1 (3d
Cir. Feb. 5, 2008). In the Whole Foods/Wild Oats transaction, the parties consummated
their merger after the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. In July 2008, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia overturned the district court’s decision.
FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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case upon a difficult (though not impossible) vertical theory of harm.337
Did the Commission make the right call in Google/DoubleClick?
Should the Commission have foregone a preliminary injunction action in
federal district court and instead brought the merger challenge directly
through its administrative process and applied expertise it had gained in
analyzing vertical issues in dynamic tech industries? An administrative case
would not have enabled the agency to obtain a preliminary injunction, thus
forcing the agency, if it found an infringement, to design an effective remedy
after the fact. Nonetheless, administrative litigation path would have
allowed the FTC to write an influential opinion, either for or against the
transaction, similar in quality and doctrinal significance to the Commission’s
decision in Hospital Corp. of America twenty years earlier.338 Perhaps I and
other colleagues attached too much weight to the trilogy of district court
preliminary injunction action losses mentioned above and acted in an
excessively risk-averse manner.339 Maybe the agency should have put aside
the other defeats and challenged the Google/DoubleClick deal, either in
district court or directly in the FTC’s administrative process, on the ground
that the resulting decision would advance the state of the art of analysis in an
important area of antitrust policy.
The questions posed here are worth considering as part of a case
reconstruction exercise. It makes sense for any competition agency to assess
its analytical methodologies and risk preference. The results of individual
case studies, joined up with data sets that show the full portfolio of agency
decisions to intervene and to stand aside, can reveal more completely the
assumptions and decision-making dynamics that determine what an agency
has done and what it chosen not to do. Without such assessments, important
patterns of behavior, analytical assumptions, and decision-making

337. For a discussion of how the FTC might have proceeded (emphasizing the
application of the agency’s distinctive mandate to bar unfair methods of competition under
Section 5 of the FTC Act), see Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pamela Jones
Harbour In the matter of Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007)
(positing that the majority’s prediction about the direction of the online advertising market
is incorrect), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statemen
ts/statement-matter-google/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T3T-CB8
5]. See also Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara I. Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An
Expanded Version of Relevant Product Market, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 783–85 (2010)
(elaborating on possible theory of harm for FTC challenge to Google/DoubleClick merger).
338. See supra notes 214-217 and accompanying text (discussing FTC’s opinion in the
Hospital Corp. merger case).
339. See Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 63, at 248 (discussing the effect of
“queuing” -- how the order in which matters come before an antitrust agency may influence
the decision it takes with respect to any single matter).
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tendencies may not be apparent, limiting the agency’s ability to understand
and address the forces that guide its actions.
Finally, case reconstructions can be an important source of legitimacy
for the FTC and other regulatory institutions. In the FTC’s investigations of
Google and in its treatment of other matters (such as the Commission’s
decision in 2012 not to challenge Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram),340 I
expect that case studies will show that good faith efforts to analyze difficult
problems, and neither the capitulation of the agency’s leadership to political
interference, nor institutional cowardice or sloth, has guided the FTC. Case
reconstructions can be especially valuable transparency mechanisms at a
time when elected officials and other observers criticize the Commission for
a lack of courage and competence, and express doubts about the motivations
that influence antitrust agencies in exercizing formidable law enforcement
powers.
F. Institutional Methods
To generate better historically relevant data and interpretation does not,
by itself, ensure integration into policy making. In some ways, historical
awareness already enriches federal antitrust agency decision making. The
relevant knowledge tends to reside in three places: (a) individuals who have
been with the agency for a significant period of time, (b) policy offices; (c)
the office of the general counsel; and (d) external observers (e.g., academic
researchers) whose work the agency from time to time draws upon, who join
the agency for occasional short-term secondments, or who are retained to
give advice on specific matters.
The DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC do not have official agency
historians, although some agency researchers from time to time have
performed that role. For example, from the early 2000s until his retirement
earlier in this decade, Marc Winerman functioned as the equivalent of an
official historian and made major scholarly contributions to the literature on
the agency’s origins and early history.341 The enhancement of the role of
340. FTC, Press Release, FTC Closes Its Investigation Into Facebook’s Proposed
Acquisition of Instagram Photo Sharing Program (Aug. 22, 2012), available at https://www
.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/closing-letters/facebook-inc-instagram-inc [https://p
erma.cc/A6XX-HHUC].
341. A notable example is Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration,
Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003). At the Antitrust
Division, an economist, Gregory Werden, did important historically oriented research and
continues to publish major commentaries on U.S. antitrust history. Gregory J. Werden, The
Foundations of Antitrust (2020).
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historical analysis in agency decision making could be accomplished by
making such a role more formal – by recruiting a researcher to serve as
“agency historian” and place the function in a body with responsibility for
larger policy development. An agency’s policy units or its general counsel’s
office are possibilities due to their deep familiarity with larger agency policy
issues and their participation in specific law enforcement matters.
V. CONCLUSION
Eighty years ago, the United States undertook a wide-ranging
examination of its competition policy system under the auspices of the
Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC).342 President Franklin
D. Roosevelt convened the TNEC to address what were seen to be serious,
persistent problems of industrial concentration and the apparent failure of the
antitrust system to impose effective corrective measures. 343 Two notable
participants in the TNEC deliberations were Walton Hamilton and Irene Till,
whose contributions included a monograph titled Antitrust in Action.344 The
two scholars introduced their study by offering a gloomy assessment of a
half-century of federal antitrust experience and by posing questions about
the system’s future:
The Sherman Act has been called “a charter of freedom” for
American industry. Why has it not been a success? Is the crux of
the trouble the congressional failure to implement the law with
adequate funds? Or is its weakness due to an insecure foundation?
Is a statute enacted in the far-away nineties adequate to the
problem of restraint five decades later? Is the machinery for its
administration subject to the wear and tear of time, and has it
become obsolescent? Can the basic issues industrial government
be transmuted into causes of action? Can the process of litigation
be made to put an erring trade back on the right track? Have courts
the distinctive competence to bring order and justice into the
affairs of industry? Can a series of suits be depended upon to hold
the national economy true to the competitive ideal? Are the
sanctions of the statute of a character to induce compliance? In a

342. Temporary National Economic Committee, Final Report and Recommendations,
U.S. Senate, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
343. ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY – A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 410-419 (1966).
344. WALTON HAMILTON & IRENE TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 16
(Temporary National Economic Committee 1941).

2020]

KEEPING SCORE

131

word, can antitrust be made the answer?345
Professor Hamilton and Dr. Till then observed that the nation faced
basic questions about the design of its competition policy system, noting that
“the Sherman Act is in for close scrutiny” and “[i]ts role in the future is most
uncertain.”346 Several paths were possible: “Whether increased ‘power’ is to
be put behind the Sherman Act, its provisions are to be modernized, its resort
to litigation is to be streamlined, awaits decision. It is even possible that
antitrust will give way to some more up-and-coming mode of regulation.”347
The two scholars then suggested how these issues might be sorted out:
The tangle of affairs to which the old, the amended, or the new
measure will be applied come straight out of the past. Only from
the knowledge of how it has worked can the law be remade and set
on its way. The line gives position to the point; the sweep through
time endows with meaning a problem of here and now.348
The circumstances that Hamilton and Till described in 1941 strongly
resemble our own today. The United States now confronts basic questions
about the capacity of its antitrust system to address industrial concentration.
A large body of commentary and discourse among elected officials has
expressed acute dissatisfaction with the existing antitrust regime and has
proposed a number of measures to enhance it or supplement it with new
regulatory frameworks.349 Making a wise choice among policy alternatives
requires the positive foundation that the two scholars suggested eighty years
ago: knowledge of how the system has worked in the past as a guide to how
to proceed in the future. A strong positive foundation is the indispensable
starting point for choices that now confront the Congress and the federal
antitrust agencies.

345. Id at 4.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing deliberations of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law).

